Rankin

This case comes before us on a writ of review to determine the legality of an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board denying a recovery to petitioner, Suzann Rankin, an employee of the Alameda County Welfare Department. Petitioner contends that her injury *859 arose out of and occurred in the course of her employment, and that she is entitled to an award under section 3600 of the California Labor Code.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner, at the time of the injury, was a social worker employed by Alameda County as an eligibility supervisor, and was compensated on a monthly basis for working 7½ hours a day, five days a week. It was understood that social workers were not compensated for the lunch hour extending from 12 to 1 p.m. However, they carried heavy workloads, which frequently necessitated their working through the lunch hour and at home and on the weekends in order to meet deadlines. Failure to adequately complete caseloads in the time required could lead to termination of employment.

Petitioner, whose workload was excessive, had previously been permitted to take off six of her regular compensated working hours for personal reasons. Her…

I dissent. This petition was before us once before, at which time we denied it without comment. Upon petition for hearing by the Supreme Court, a hearing was granted and the Supreme Court thereafter ordered the matter back to us by issuing an alternative writ returnable before us and citing the following cases: State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 925 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 323 , 434 P.2d 619 ]; Western Greyhound Lines v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; and Smith v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 814 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 ]—the first two cases involving the “personal comfort” doctrine, and in all of which the injuries were incurred during compensated time..

The majority opinion turns its back on the substantial evidence rule and works out a theory which extends the “personal comfort” doctrine far beyond any present authority. I cannot agree to this approach, not only because I am convinced that the facts do not warrant it but also because I believe that if any new extension is to be made, the Supreme Court should be the one to do so.

There is no dispute as to the facts: the employee had taken six…

This case comes before us on a writ of review to determine the legality of an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board denying a recovery to petitioner, Suzann Rankin, an employee of the Alameda County Welfare Department. Petitioner contends that her injury arose out of and occurred in the course of her employment, and that she is entitled to an award under section 3600 of the California Labor Code.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner, at the time of the injury, was a social worker employed by Alameda County as an eligibility supervisor, and was compensated on a monthly basis for working 7 1/2 hours a day, five days a week. It was understood that social workers were not compensated for the lunch hour extending from 12 to 1 p.m. However, they carried heavy workloads, which frequently necessitated their working through the lunch hour and at home and on the weekends in order to meet deadlines. Failure to adequately complete caseloads in the time required could lead to termination of employment.

Petitioner, whose workload was excessive, had previously been permitted to take off six of her regular compensated working hours for personal…