Pierce

This court’s opinion in Medina v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 744, 747 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 557 ], requires the Department (DMV) to prove, and the administrative hearing officer to expressly find, that a person was actually driving a vehicle in order to justify the DMV’s suspension of the person’s license to drive for failing to submit to a blood-alcohol test under the implied consent law (Veh. Code, §§ 23157 & 13353). A later case from Division Five of the First District, Rice v. Pierce (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1460 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 832 ], did not follow Medina and instead held no such proof or finding was required. Having reexamined Medina in light of Rice , we decline to depart from our earlier decision. Because the DMV hearing officer in this case failed to make any finding about whether appellant was driving, we will reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to order the officer to address, and make a finding on, the issue.

On November 3, 1988, appellant Candy Gaylen Jackson was arrested for a violation of section 23152, subdivision (a) (driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs). The DMV suspended her license, pursuant to section 13353. At…