Vega

Introduction

Defendant Walter Wilfredo Vega was convicted by jury verdicts of two counts of violation of Penal Code section 666 (petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction, counts I and II) and one count of violation of Penal Code section 459 (burglary of the second degree, count III). 1 In addition, the jury found true allegations that defendant had previously served two separate prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had committed the subject burglary while released from custody pending trial on the theft charges (§ 12022.1). As a consequence of these verdicts and findings, defendant was sentenced to a total of seven years and four months in state prison.

Defendant does not directly challenge the jury’s verdicts or findings, but does assert on this appeal that a variety of sentencing errors resulted in his receiving an excessive and unconstitutional sentence. We reject all of defendant’s contentions with the exception of the one contention contained in the portion of this opinion that is not published.

Statement of the Case

On June 20, 1985, an information was filed against defendant. He was charged in two counts with…

I concur in parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent from the reasoning and con *521 elusion of part IV, i.e., that a Penal Code section 12022.1 1 “on bail” enhancement is exempt from section 1170.1, subdivision (g)’s double-the-base-term limitation.

Preliminarily, a brief review of section 1170.1, subdivision (g) clearly reveals that the Legislature did not explicitly exempt “on bail” enhancements from the operation of the double-the-base-term limitation. 2 the major-The conclusion of the majority rests solely upon the theory that the provisions of California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (f) (hereafter article I, section 28(f)) supersede any statutory restriction for prior felony convictions and that the “on bail” enhancement of section 12022.1 is, in essence, a “prior felony conviction” enhancement for purposes of analysis of the applicability of the double-the-base-term limitation. Consequently, this is the only argument I need consider.

The gist of the majority’s argument is that since the conviction and imposition of sentence for the “primary offense” (§ 12022.1) must take place “prior” to the implementation of punishment for…

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

REID, J. [*] —

Defendant Walter Wilfredo Vega was convicted by jury verdicts of two counts of violation of Penal Code section 666 (petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction, counts I and II) and one count of violation of Penal Code section 459 (burglary of the second degree, count III). [1] In addition, the jury found true allegations that defendant had previously served two separate prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had committed the subject burglary while released from custody pending trial on the theft charges (§ 12022.1). As a consequence of these verdicts and findings, defendant was sentenced to a total of seven years and four months in state prison.

Defendant does not directly challenge the jury's verdicts or findings, but does assert on this appeal that a variety of sentencing errors resulted in his receiving an excessive and unconstitutional sentence. We reject all of defendant's contentions with the exception of the one contention contained in the portion of this opinion that is not published.

On June 20, 1985, an information was filed against defendant. He…