22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4c7,MEMORANDUM Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. appeals from the district court’s order dismissing its action alleging, inter alia, defamation and trade libel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Price v. Stossel, 620 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Sedgwick’s defamation and trade libel claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute because defendant Delsman’s conduct was in furtherance of his free speech rights in connection with an issue of public interest, and Sedgwick did not meet its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 425.16; Ruiz v. Harbor View Cmty. Ass’n, 134 Cal.App.4th 1456 , 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 140-46 (Ct.App.2005) (setting forth § 425.16 analysis, and concluding that defendant’s letter containing rhetorical hyperbole was free speech in connection with an issue of public interest and that plaintiff did not establish a probability of prevailing on his libel claim). Sedgwick’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4f9,

MEMORANDUM

Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. appeals from the district court’s order dismissing its action alleging, inter alia, defamation and trade libel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Price v. Stossel, 620 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Sedgwick’s defamation and trade libel claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute because defendant Delsman’s conduct was in furtherance of his free speech rights in connection with an issue of public interest, and Sedgwick did not meet its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 425.16; Ruiz v. Harbor View Cmty. Ass’n, 134 Cal.App.4th 1456 , 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 140-46 (Ct.App.2005) (setting forth § 425.16 analysis, and concluding that defendant’s letter containing rhetorical hyperbole was free speech in connection with an issue of public interest and that plaintiff did not establish a probability of prevailing on his libel claim).

Sedgwick’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.