Hallendorf

Petitioner, plaintiff in a personal injury action, seeks relief by extraordinary writ after respondent court granted a defense motion to compel further answers to interrogatories and to compel compliance with a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of medical records. We issued an alternative writ,. because it appeared that the court’s order violated principles announced in Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ], in that the order required petitioner *555 to disclose his entire lifetime medical histoiy. The Britt decision was filed on March 27, 1978, shortly after the date of respondent court’s order.

Petitioner commenced an action for damages arising from a collision with the automobile of real party in interest, defendant in the action. He seeks general damages, medical and related expenses, property damage and loss of earnings. Petitioner alleges that at the time of the collision he was gainfully employed as a physician-surgeon, earning an average monthly salary in excess of $2,840, and that as a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant he has been and will be prevented from attending to his usual…

I dissent. The majority’s reliance on Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ] is not misplaced; it is, however, a manifestation of the old adage “bad cases make bad law.” And while a good pragmatic argument can be made to distinguish the instant case from Britt on the ground that Britt involves a mixed bag of *558 personal injury, mental distress, and property damage claims by a multitude of claimants, the real vice of Britt is that it is contrary to clear legislative mandate and sound public policy. In its ultimate application, moreover, Britt is a vehicle for the perpetration of injustice and inequity upon those persons and entities who are sued in personal injury actions.

Britt has established a double standard of the right to discoveiy—one for plaintiffs and a more limited one for defendants. In reaching this patently discriminatory result, the majority in Britt has not seen fit to explain how it got there except by the exercise of judicial fiat. Or, as Justice Richardson so poignantly expressed it in his dissent, “Initially, I note that the majority, inexplicably, has either forgotten or has chosen to ignore what I had always…

Gassett, Perry, Frank & Bondelie, William L. Reagan and John S. Burton for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

ROUSE, J.

Petitioner, plaintiff in a personal injury action, seeks relief by extraordinary writ after respondent court granted a defense motion to compel further answers to interrogatories and to compel compliance with a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of medical records. We issued an alternative writ, because it appeared that the court's order violated principles announced in Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ], in that the order required petitioner to disclose his entire lifetime medical history. The Britt decision was filed on March 27, 1978, shortly after the date of respondent court's order.

(1) Petitioner commenced an action for damages arising from a collision with the automobile of real party in interest, defendant in the action. He seeks general damages, medical and related expenses, property damage and loss of earnings. Petitioner alleges that at the time of the collision he was gainfully employed as a physician-surgeon, earning an average monthly salary in excess of $2,840, and that as a proximate…