United States v. Gerard Snapp

MEMORANDUM

Gerard Snapp appeals his conviction for violating 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(F), which makes it unlawful to “sell or offer for sale” an endangered wildlife species. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Snapp’s proposed jury instructions and instead choosing not to provide a jury instruction as to the meaning of the term “offer for sale” as used in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir.1998) (“When a statute does not define a term, we generally interpret that term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the words that Congress used.”); see also United States v. Somsamouth, 352 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.2003) (“ ‘[T]he district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 986 (9th Cir.2003)).

The ESA does not define the term “offer for sale.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532 . However, the implementing regulations support a broad definition by assuming that most advertisements are “offers for sale” under the Act. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.21…