People v. Harmon

A jury convicted appellant of robbery and appellant then admitted an alleged prior felony conviction of forcible rape. The court sentenced him to state prison for ten years, the five-year upper term for robbery and five years, consecutive, for his prior felony rape conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a).)

Appellant contends he was denied a representive cross-section jury venire, denied effective assistance of counsel at an in-court “lineup,” and denied equal protection by the court’s trial transcript orders.

We find appellant’s contentions without merit and affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Crime

On February 3, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. Bonnie DeJong was unlocking the door of her crisis pregnancy center when a man approached and said “Hey, how you doing?” She looked up and saw a dark-complected Black man. The man grabbed the purse hanging from her shoulder but could not free it from her briefcase. He punched Ms. DeJong on her left cheek and still could not get the purse free. He then pushed her into a wall, she lost her balance, the purse got loose, and she screamed.

*556 Richard Denham, who worked in the same building as Ms. DeJong, heard the…

I concur in the result reached by the majority in view of Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 ]. That case held, for purposes of determining whether a jury represents a cross-section of the community, the “community” is the judicial district. There is no evidence in the case before us Blacks are underrepresented on Norwalk Superior Court juries in relation to the number of jury eligible Blacks within the Southeast Judicial District. (Cf. Williams v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 746 .)

In light of the holding in Williams , everything in the majority opinion except footnote 5, (ante, p. 559) is dicta. However, because some of that dicta involves the county’s policy of reassigning jurors because of transportation difficulties in getting to their assigned court, I write separately to express my view that the current policy would not rebut a future defendant’s prima facie showing of a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.

Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, see majority opinion at page 558, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest to maintain that systematic exclusion.…

WOODS (Fred), J.

A jury convicted appellant of robbery and appellant then admitted an alleged prior felony conviction of forcible rape. The court sentenced him to state prison for ten years, the five-year upper term for robbery and five years, consecutive, for his prior felony rape conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a).) [1]

Appellant contends he was denied a representive cross-section jury venire, denied effective assistance of counsel at an in-court "lineup," and denied equal protection by the court's trial transcript orders.

We find appellant's contentions without merit and affirm the judgment.

On February 3, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. Bonnie DeJong was unlocking the door of her crisis pregnancy center when a man approached and said "Hey, how you doing?" She looked up and saw a dark-complected Black man. The man grabbed the purse hanging from her shoulder but could not free it from her briefcase. He punched Ms. DeJong on her left cheek and still could not get the purse free. He then pushed her into a wall, she lost her balance, the purse got loose, and she screamed.

Richard Denham, who worked in the same building as Ms. DeJong, heard the scream, went to the door, saw…