22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4f1,MEMORANDUM Thomas O. Spicer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action alleging the City of Simi Valley discriminated against him by issuing him citations for illegal parking. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013 , 1019 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Spicer’s ADA claim because, assuming Spicer was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he was excluded from participating in, or benefitting from, any service or program because of his disability. See McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir.2004) (listing elements for a claim under Title II of the ADA). To the extent Spicer seeks to overturn the state court judgment, we lack jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil COrp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 , 125 S.Ct. 1517 , 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Spicer’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T523,

MEMORANDUM

Thomas O. Spicer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action alleging the City of Simi Valley discriminated against him by issuing him citations for illegal parking. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013 , 1019 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Spicer’s ADA claim because, assuming Spicer was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he was excluded from participating in, or benefitting from, any service or program because of his disability. See McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir.2004) (listing elements for a claim under Title II of the ADA). To the extent Spicer seeks to overturn the state court judgment, we lack jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil COrp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 , 125 S.Ct. 1517 , 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

Spicer’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.