In Re Patrick W.

The minor was found by the juvenile court to be a person coming under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions *617 Code in that he had committed murder in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code. He was committed to the Youth Authority; he has appealed; we reverse.

The case for the People 1 is that, angry at his father, a police officer, the minor had intentionally shot and killed him. Alerted by school authorities and other persons, deputy sheriffs arrested the minor and took him to the station for interrogation. Admittedly they gave him the formal Miranda rights and also asked if he desired to talk to the “parents.” Quite understandably, the minor declined to face his mother, whom he had just widowed, It is the contention of the minor here that, since his grandparents were available and had sought to speak to the minor, the deputies were under an obligation to ask him if he desired to talk to them and that the deputies had not done so.

This is the second time that this case has been before this court. On September 1, 1978, we held that the order of commitment must be reversed because of that failure. (In re Patrick W. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 520 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.…

I respectfully dissent. My reading of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 ], brings forth but one conclusion: It is an impermissible extension of the Miranda rules to reverse the order of commitment of the minor in this case because the officers before questioning him never informed him that his grandparents were nearby and available to talk with him, and never specifically asked him if he wanted to talk to them.

Under the ruling of the court in Fare v. Michael C., supra, the question of whether a waiver of Miranda rights is free and intelligent—be it a waiver by an adult or one by a juvenile—is to be resolved on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. Using the court’s language in Fare , “This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where the interrogation of juveniles is involved.” ( 442 U.S. at p. 725 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 212 ].)

*622 Fare v. Michael C., supra, involved the refusal of the arresting officers to honor the minor’s request to see his probation officer before questioning him. The California Supreme…

KINGSLEY, Acting P.J.

The minor was found by the juvenile court to be a person coming under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code in that he had committed murder in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code. He was committed to the Youth Authority; he has appealed; we reverse.

The case for the People [1] is that, angry at his father, a police officer, the minor had intentionally shot and killed him. Alerted by school authorities and other persons, deputy sheriffs arrested the minor and took him to the station for interrogation. Admittedly they gave him the formal Miranda rights and also asked if he desired to talk to the "parents." Quite understandably, the minor declined to face his mother, whom he had just widowed. (1a) It is the contention of the minor here that, since his grandparents were available and had sought to speak to the minor, the deputies were under an obligation to ask him if he desired to talk to them and that the deputies had not done so.

This is the second time that this case has been before this court. On September 1, 1978, we held that the order of commitment must be reversed because of that failure. ( In re Patrick W. (1978) 84 Cal.…