Coronado

On August 26, 1977, Frank Coronado was charged with battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and with annoying and molesting a child (Pen. Code, § 647a). On February 8, 1978, he entered a plea of guilty to the battery and the charge of molesting was dismissed in the furtherance of justice. On May 3, 1978, criminal proceedings were suspended in the municipal court and the matter certified to the superior court to determine whether Coronado was a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6300 et seq. (the Article). 1 On August 30, 1978, a hearing was held and he was determined to be a MDSO and committed to the Department of Health for six weeks.

The facts giving rise to the charges in this case are not relevant to the appeal except to note that the battery consisted of Coronado’s placing his hands on the buttocks of a 12-year-old female while the two were riding the escalator at a Sears department store in Chula Vista.

Coronado contends first the superior court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether he was a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to the Article (more specifically § 6302).

Section 6302, subdivision (a), reads:…

I dissent.

The impact on the individual alleged to be a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) of indefinite confinement in a prison-like state mental institution has been eloquently and dramatically described by our Supreme Court. It has held that because of the drastic impairment of liberty and the permanent scarring of an individual’s reputation, an *498 MDSO finding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and conviction by a unanimous jury. (People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 310 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 535 P.2d 352 ]; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 535 P.2d 373 ].)

The Legislature, sensitive to the judicial insight expressed in Burnick and Feagley , responded by amending Welfare and Institutions Code section 6302, subdivisions (a) and (d), effective January 1977. No longer may a person convicted of any criminal offense be held to determine whether he or she is an MDSO. Only those persons who are convicted of specific sex offenses or of a felony or misdemeanor which is shown by clear proof or stipulation to have been committed primarily for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification may be placed on the MDSO track. (Welf. & Inst. Code,…

On August 26, 1977, Frank Coronado was charged with battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and with annoying and molesting a child (Pen. Code, § 647a). On February 8, 1978, he entered a plea of guilty to the battery and the charge of molesting was dismissed in the furtherance of justice. On May 3, 1978, criminal proceedings were suspended in the municipal court and the matter certified to the superior court to determine whether Coronado was a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6300 et seq. (the Article). [1] On August 30, 1978, a hearing was held and he was determined to be a MDSO and committed to the Department of Health for six weeks.

The facts giving rise to the charges in this case are not relevant to the appeal except to note that the battery consisted of Coronado's placing his hands on the buttocks of a 12-year-old female while the two were riding the escalator at a Sears department store in Chula Vista.

Coronado contends first the superior court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether he was a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to the Article (more specifically § 6302).

Section 6302,…