Baroid

I dissent. I would uphold the decision of the board.

Our review of the board’s decision involves recognition of two basic considerations: First, that it has long been the policy, at both the administrative level and in the courts, to liberally construe the workers’ compensation law to provide coverage whenever possible, thereby protecting the injured worker. (Dimmig v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 860, 867 ; Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 155 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ]; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 538 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 750 ] and Lefebvre v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 745, 750 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 246 ].) Second, the appellate standard of review in matters such as this is that of substantial evidence; as was explained in Southern California Rapid Transit Dist., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 158, 162 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 588 P.2d 806 ], “judicial review of decisions of the WCAB on factual matters is limited to determining whether the decision, based on the entire record, is supported by substantial evidence. (§ 5952, subd. (d) [Labor Code].…

Respondent Thomas G. Hancock (hereinafter also applicant) sustained injury on July 5, 1979, in an automobile accident on a public street while he was on the way to work for petitioner N.L. Baroid (employer). Applicant was in his own automobile at the time of injury. It is undisputed that he was en route to his place of employment at the time of injury. This accident has resulted in severe injury to applicant, including paraplegia; further, the injury has affected his memory concerning the details of the events leading up to his injury.

The WCAB has found that applicant's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner contends that under the "going and coming" rule applicant's injury is not compensable. Applicant and the WCAB, however, assert that the injury is compensable under one or more exceptions to the going and coming rule.

(1a) "The going and coming rule precludes [recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act] for injury suffered during the course of a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances. ( Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 104…

Respondent Thomas G. Hancock (hereinafter also applicant) sustained injury on July 5, 1979, in an automobile accident on a public street while he was on the way to work for petitioner N. L. Baroid (employer). Applicant was in his own automobile at the time of injury. It is undisputed that he was en route to his place of employment at the time of injury. This accident has resulted in severe injury to applicant, including paraplegia; further, the injury has affected his memory concerning the details of the events leading up to his injury.

The WCAB has found that applicant’s injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Petitioner contends that under the “going and coming” rule applicant’s injury is not compensable. Applicant and the WCAB, however, assert that the injury is compensable under one or more exceptions to the going and coming rule.

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“The going and coming rule precludes [recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act] for injury suffered during the course of a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances. (Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.…