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A jury convicted defendant of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) *595 Defendant appeals, contending (1) his statements to the police were involuntary and should have been excluded from evidence as the product of coercive police interrogation, (2) the victims of the molestations were not credible witnesses, resulting in a verdict unsupported by sufficient evidence, (3) the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the victims’ prior sexual knowledge; and (4) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. We have listened to the four-hour tape recording of defendant’s interrogation and conclude defendant’s first contention is meritorious. On that basis, we shall reverse the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

The following facts are taken from the police interrogation tapes and testimony at trial.

On March 20, 1983, Officer Virgil Lowe brought defendant to the Stockton Police Department for questioning. The interrogation began at 11:40 a.m. Lowe informed defendant he was a possible suspect in a child molestation investigation and read defendant his Miranda…

I concur in nearly all aspects of Justice Carr’s opinion. I write only to add my view that the rule of People v. *603 Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ], requiring the People to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt, is required by article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.

For reasons stated in Justice Carr’s opinion, I agree that the privilege contained in Evidence Code section 940 survives enactment of Proposition 8 and applies to extrajudicial statements.

Evidence Code section 940 provides that “7b the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Italics added; see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].)

The crucial question, then, is whether the Jimenez rule is required by the state constitutional privilege so that the rule exists “under ... the Constitution of . . . the State of California.” (Evid. Code, § 940.) In Jimenez , our Supreme Court held the reasonable doubt standard is required in…

I dissent.

I have independently listened to the four-hour tape recording, which resulted in some incriminating admissions by the defendant, to determine whether those admissions were voluntarily made. (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 609 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ].) I conclude as did the trial judge that the four-hour interview was not a coercive interrogation but rather a dialogue between defendant and Officer Virgil Lowe of the Stockton Police Department in which Officer Lowe skillfully interrogated and commented on the realities of the molestation allegations made against the defendant by his three step-grandchildren. A careful review of the tapes fails to indicate to me any physical or mental coercion which precipitated the defendant’s incriminating statements. I reach this conclusion readily and beyond any question of doubt, regardless of the standard of review to be applied. The courtesy and politeness of the officer during the interrogation was exemplary. The manner in which he presented the evidence against the defendant compared favorably to that of skilled trial counsel in examination of a witness in court. Neither in tone nor tempo of the questions…

A jury convicted defendant of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) Defendant appeals, contending (1) his statements to the police were involuntary and should have been excluded from evidence as the product of coercive police interrogation, (2) the victims of the molestations were not credible witnesses, resulting in a verdict unsupported by sufficient evidence, (3) the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the victims' prior sexual knowledge; and (4) the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. We have listened to the four-hour tape recording of defendant's interrogation and conclude defendant's first contention is meritorious. (1a, 2a) (See fn. 1.) On that basis, we shall reverse the judgment. [1]

The following facts are taken from the police interrogation tapes and testimony at trial.

On March 20, 1983, Officer Virgil Lowe brought defendant to the Stockton Police Department for questioning. The interrogation began at 11:40 a.m. Lowe informed defendant he was a possible suspect in a child molestation investigation and read defendant his Miranda rights. (…