Riegler

I respectfully dissent.

When Belton 1 is read in the context of the instant case, one is compelled to the dreary conclusion that the high court either paid no attention to the facts of the latter or has used this remand as an opaque precursor of fundamental change.

In an attempt to understand the remand, it may be desirable to review the reasoning behind the special rules involving automobile searches. One of the two reasons for the distinction between search of automobiles and other private property is that the configuration, use and regulation of automobiles dilutes the reasonable expectation of privacy that normally exists in reference to other species of property. (See Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 760-761 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 242-243 , 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591 ].)

What was the expectation of privacy in the two packages in the instant case? The material was sent through international mails; the markings on the packages announced that fact. It went through customs, and thus was subject to search. I cannot follow the argument of the majority that appellant had a greater expectation of privacy in the packages than the addressee. 3 He was involved in a shipment of two…

The United States Supreme Court granted respondent’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this court’s previous opinion and remanded the matter for further consideration in light of New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 ]. Pursuant to the high court’s command, we have reconsidered the matter, and conclude the Belton rule permitting a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an automobile and containers found therein when incidental to a lawful arrest, is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, we again reverse the judgment.

The facts are these:

The packages-were addressed to Michael and Selma Fortner, 1130 W Street, Merced, California.

The packages were resealed by the customs agent and Huber sent the packages to Patrick Dorn, a United States postal inspector in Fresno, who received them on November 21, 1977.

Dorn brought the packages to Merced and contacted a Lieutenant Moore who was in charge of specialized manpower assigned to crime

*320 control (SMACC) in Merced County. Huber also had contacted Moore on November 21, 1977, and told him about the packages.

The plan was to have a controlled delivery, and on…

FRANSON, Acting P.J.

The United States Supreme Court granted respondent's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this court's previous opinion and remanded the matter for further consideration in light of New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 ]. Pursuant to the high court's command, we have reconsidered the matter, and conclude the Belton rule permitting a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an automobile and containers found therein when incidental to a lawful arrest, is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, we again reverse the judgment.

The facts are these:

On November 8, 1977, a customs inspector at JFK Airport in New York City notified John Huber, a special agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration, that a detector dog had alerted the inspector to two packages sent from Germany and when the inspector opened them up he observed what he believed to be hashish. Chemical analysis confirmed the substance was hashish.

The packages were addressed to Michael and Selma Fortner, 1130 W Street, Merced, California.

The packages were resealed by the customs agent and Huber sent the packages to Patrick Dorn, a…