Opinion

Four plaintiffs, each suing on behalf of himself and “all other persons similarly situated,” appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of the various defendants. The cases are consolidated for hearing in this court.

Facts — Superior Court

We shall confine our statement of facts to those which appear in our record in the case of Addington, et al., vs. Industrial Indemnity Company, et al. None of the procedural differences between that case and the other three has any bearing on any issue before us.

Herewith a summary of Addington’s complaint, which was filed on behalf of himself and members of the class whom he purports to represent, the class being composed of persons who have in the past received awards from the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, or its predecessor, the Industrial Accident Commission, in proceedings before the board in which defendant Industrial Indemnity Company was a defendant by virtue of having insured the employer. Each award was made after section 5800 of the Labor Code was amended in 1945 to provide for interest on awards. Neither plaintiff, nor any member of the class, was ever paid any interest. In plaintiff’s case the unpaid interest on an award of $4,300 amounted to $20.90. The failure to pay interest was caused by a "policy and practice of defendant not to pay interest on awards. By law payments received were, however, applied first to extinguish interest and only then credited against the principal due. (Civ. Code, § 1479.) Thus the failure to pay interest, as such, left unpaid an amount of principal equal to the amount of interest due. The aggregate amount thus owed by defendant to plaintiff and the members of his class exceeds $250,000;

The complaint further alleges that, because it was economically unfeasible for any plaintiff to comply, the court should dispense with the requirement of section 5806 of the Labor Code making the entry of superior court judgments on unpaid awards conditional upon the filing of a certified copy of the award. In fact the pursuit of defendant’s policy of not paying interest on awards is made possible by the economic realities which make it impracticable to pursue the small unpaid portion of each particular award. None of the members of the class has a plain, speedy or adequate remedy other than the maintenance of a class action.

A second cause of action realleges the first and adds allegations attempting to justify an award of punitive damages.

On March 17, 1969, defendant demurred to the complaint, claiming that the superior court lacked jurisdiction, that no cause of action for class or any other relief was stated and that, in any event, relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The demurrer was overruled on May 14, 1969. A petition for a writ of prohibition was denied, without opinion, by division two of this court on June 17, 1969, and a petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was denied by that court on July 16, 1969. Defendant answered by way of a general denial and eight affirmative defenses on July 31,1969.

During and after these superior court maneuvers, certain proceedings had taken place before the board. Their outcome encouraged defendant to file a notice of motion for summary judgment on September 23, 1970. The motion was accompanied by various exhibits showing what had taken place before the board. The gist of the motion was that the entire problem was now res judicata. It was granted on October 5, 1970. Summary judgment and this appeal followed in due course.

Facts — Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board

Meanwhile, back at the board, this is what had happened: three days after filing his complaint in the superior court, plaintiff, again acting on behalf of the same class, filed an application which referred to the superior court action just filed. He then proceeded to apply for the preparation of a single award against defendant, establishing the identities of the class members and the dates and amounts of the awards which had previously been made in their favor. This was perhaps asked for in anticipation of the possibility that the superior court would not permit plaintiff and the members of his class to omit compliance with section 5806 of the Labor Code. (See fn. 3, supra.) After an adverse decision by a referee, plaintiff sought reconsideration which was granted. On February 16, 1970, the board, sitting in bank, filed a lengthy opinion which resulted in the denial of any relief.

In its opinion the board first decided that it did have authority to entertain class actions. It then went on, however, to hold that plaintiff had not stated “a proper claim for class suit relief.”

Various reasons for this result were adduced by the board. First it held that, unlike in Daar v. Yellow Cab Company, 61 Cal.2d 695, 713-715 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 433 P.2d 732 ], substantial benefits would not result from class litigation. That was so, said the board, because each member of the class could seek an order under board rule 10832 requiring the defendant to show cause why the full award had not been paid; further, since the amounts paid had first to be applied against unpaid interest, compensation had been left payable, which permitted the imposition of a 10 percent penalty under section 5814 of the Labor Code. These remedies, said the board, were available regardless of the size of the unpaid amount.

Nor, thought the board, would a class action avoid multiplicity of litigation: obviously litigation before the board was already pending in each case.

Further, compliance with plaintiff’s application would require 146 working days by every person employed by the board, during which time nothing else could be accomplished. Finally the board’s opinion expresses fear that to allow a class proceeding before it would amount to an intermeddling in the “thousands of . . . attorney client relationships” involved in the existing proceedings before the board.

Plaintiff, too, sought help from this court; however his petition for a writ of review was denied, without opinion, by division one on July 20, 1970. The Supreme Court denied a hearing on August 19, 1970.

Discussion

At the outset it should be noted that the legal sufficiency of the superior court complaint is not before us. The sole ground on which the summary judgment was based was the claimed conclusive effect of the board’s decision of February 16, 1970, denying relief. Nor do defendants, in this court, seek to protect their judgments by arguing that the complaints are fatally defective.

Turning to the merits of the res judicata claim, it is well to focus at once on the limited relief plaintiffs requested from the board. Neither on behalf of themselves, nor on behalf of any member of their classes, did they ask for any judicial relief in excess of what was already on the board’s books. They merely wanted the board to make it economically feasible to translate existing unpaid awards into dollars and cents by enabling them, through the medium, of a single award, to obtain a single certified document with which to comply with section 5806 of the Labor Code. The appeal to the board was therefore directed, to its implied administrative power to order its employees to perform an essentially clerical act; the board’s judicial function was never invoked.

There can be no question that in a proper case a final decision by the board must be given res judicata effect in the superior court. (French v. Rishell, 40 Cal.2d 477, 480 [ 254 P.2d 26 ]; cf. Scott v. Industrial Acc. Com., 46 Cal.2d 76, 83 [ 293 P.2d 18 ].) Nor can it be doubted that the doctrine of res judicata applies, again in a proper case, to final rulings on points of law and not just to determinations of fact. (Olwell v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.2d 147, 150-153 [ 168 P.2d 972 ] [“A decision on the merits, however, is not necessarily a decision upon the facts.”]; Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47, 51-55 [ 92 P.2d 804 ]; Sterling v. Galen, 242 Cal.App.2d 178, 182-185 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 312 ]; Rest. Judgments, §§ 50, 70.) Finally, whatever we may privately think about the merits of the board’s “let them eat cake” approach to this problem, we recognize that, subject to certain exceptions (e.g., Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal.2d 749, 757-759 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 371 P.2d 758 ]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) § 216, pp. 3351-3353), “[a]n erroneous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.” (Martin v. Martin, 2 Cal.3d 752, 763 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 470 P.2d 662 ]; Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 636, 640 [ 134 P.2d 242 ].)

We think, however, defendants’ assertion that the board’s ruling has a res judicata effect on the superior court actions is based on a rather generous view of what the board purported to adjudicate. They claim that the board held that workmen’s compensation applicants, whose awards have not been satisfied as to interest, cannot pursue what remedy they have in a class action before any tribunal. No such broad issue was ever presented to the board. Indeed we may safely assume that the board would have shied away from deciding any such question, obviously outside of its jurisdiction. The basic class action was being, pursued in the superior court. Before the board, plaintiffs merely sought ancillary relief which, if granted, would make it easier for them to obtain their superior court remedy. As noted, the complaint there revealed a failure by plaintiffs and the members of their class to comply with section 5806 of the Labor Code. Obviously on any eventual appeal plaintiffs would be in better shape if in the meanwhile they found themselves able to comply with section 5806 and to amend their complaints accordingly. Hence they asked for the purely ministerial relief of the preparation of a single award. For reasons sufficient to the board, that relief was denied. However, we do not see how that denial can be escalated into a holding, binding on the superior court, that it may not proceed to try the pending class actions on the merits. If, ultimately, it should be held that plaintiffs’ failure to comply with section 5806 of the Labor Code is fatal, then, of course, the board’s refusal to grant class relief may indeed turn out to have been decisive. Today, however, the question of the sufficiency of the complaints which seek to excuse compliance with section 5806 is, as we have pointed out, not before us. Assuming that the cases go to trial on the present pleadings, plaintiffs will, of course, have to show at some time just who the members of the class are and how much each of them is owed by defendants. This proof can obviously be accomplished without the kind of cooperation from the board that'was refused in its February 16, 1970 decision.

It is worth noting, if further demonstration of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata were required, that the reasons which the board gives for not permitting the class relief prayed for are peculiar to its own jurisdiction and not necessarily applicable to the superior court. Thus the board holds, right or wrong, that the enforcement remedies provided by board rule 10832 and section 5814 of the Labor Code are “just as advantageous and of just as much benefit to each applicant, as any form of class litigation.” Both types of proceedings are conducted before the board, not in the superior court. Next the board points out that class relief by it would not avoid multiplicity of litigation, since each member of the class already has a workmen’s compensation proceeding pending. Again, right or wrong, the board points to matters pending before it, but not in the superior court.

Obviously the further reason for denying relief based upon the amount of work it would entail for the board’s staff is most peculiar to the board’s internal problems and has nothing to do with the merits of the superior court litigation. Finally, the board’s last point, that to grant class relief would amount to the sanctioning of interferences with numerous attorney-client relationships, again raises a problem peculiar to the board’s own cases. The record reveals no such relationship between any member of plaintiffs’ classes and any attorney in any superior court proceeding— except, of course, with respect to the four class representatives involved in these appeals.

The judgments, and each of them, are reversed.

Aiso, J., and Reppy, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied April 25, 1972, and respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 7, 1972. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Nevertheless whenever in this opinion we speak of “plaintiffs” or “defendants,” we refer to all four plaintiffs and all four defendants. The other three appeals merely involve different class representatives as plaintiffs and different insurers as defendants. Section 5806 of the Labor Code reads as follows: “Any party affected thereby may file a certified copy of the findings and order, decision, or award of the appeals board with the clerk of the superior court of any county. Judgment shall be entered immediately by the clerk in conformity therewith.” The cost of obtaining a certified copy of a one-page award is $1.50. Each additional page costs 75