In Re Monterrosa

The issue in this case is whether the presentence credits belatedly awarded to defendant Robert J. Monterrosa should, instead of advancing his parole discharge date, have been applied to reduce his parole revocation confinement. The trial court granted defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered his release. The People appealed. We reverse.

The facts are undisputed. Defendant was arrested in 1981 and sentenced in 1982 for vehicle theft. He was released on parole in December 1983. In February 1984, his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison for four months. In June 1984, shortly after his rerelease to parole, defendant became a parolee-at-large and his parole was suspended.

On March 14, 1985, the First Appellate District filed an opinion awarding defendant an additional 121 days of presentence credit under Penal Code section 2900.5 for time he spent in prison between December 1981 and March 1982, prior to sentencing on the vehicle theft charge. 1 The Board of Prison Terms deducted this credit from defendant’s parole period, advancing his parole discharge date.

In July 1985, defendant was rearrested. His parole was revoked in September and he…

Dissenting. — I would affirm. The trial court correctly decided that once the determinate sentence has been served, the unused presentence credits are to be applied, in this case, to the ensuing period of imprisonment ordered upon revocation of petitioner’s parole. While Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (c) is not a model of clarity, it sufficiently dictates that the unused credits be applied to such period of imprisonment.

Subdivision (c) defines the “term of imprisonment” to which presentence credits are to be applied as including “any period of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole, prior to discharge, . . .” The Legislature thus identifies two periods of imprisonment to which presentence credits might apply — the prison term imposed by the court and any period of imprisonment ordered by the Board of Prison Terms upon parole revocation. The sentencing scheme, in the context of determinate sentencing, indeed contemplates that the defendant will, unless waived by the Board, be on parole for up to three years (Pen. Code, §§ 1170, subds. (c) and (e), 3000), and that he may be reconfined while on parole (Pen. Code, § 3057). As…

Concurring in the judgment. — The lead opinion states that the construction of Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (c) contended for by the People and that advocated by the defendant are both reasonable. To the contrary, there can be no reasonable construction of the words “imprisonment and parole” (italics added) as those words are, in context, gibberish. Perhaps the Legislature meant “imprisonment on parole” i.e., imprisonment for parole violation. I hope our lawmakers will clarify their intent.

I join in the decision.

The issue in this case is whether the presentence credits belatedly awarded to defendant Robert J. Monterrosa should, instead of advancing his parole discharge date, have been applied to reduce his parole revocation confinement. The trial court granted defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered his release. The People appealed. We reverse.

The facts are undisputed. Defendant was arrested in 1981 and sentenced in 1982 for vehicle theft. He was released on parole in December 1983. In February 1984, his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison for four months. In June 1984, shortly after his rerelease to parole, defendant became a parolee-at-large and his parole was suspended.

On March 14, 1985, the First Appellate District filed an opinion awarding defendant an additional 121 days of presentence credit under Penal Code section 2900.5 for time he spent in prison between December 1981 and March 1982, prior to sentencing on the vehicle theft charge. [1] The Board of Prison Terms deducted this credit from defendant's parole period, advancing his parole discharge date.

In July 1985, defendant was rearrested. His parole was revoked in…