Jacobs

Jacobs v. Fire Insurance Exchange

Good Law
1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 120·227 Cal. App. 3d 584·278 Cal. Rptr. 52·91 Daily Journal DAR 1632·91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1033
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaFebruary 6, 1991A048070California13,720 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Chin, J.

Plaintiff and appellant Howard Jacobs (appellant) appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of Fire Insurance Exchange (insurer) after the trial court concluded that the tortfeasor was not a permanent resident of the household of the named insured, Erma Peterson (Erma), and therefore was not insured under her policy. We find no error in the granting of summary judgment and therefore affirm.

The Facts

Summary. In November of 1986, 18-year-old Luis Arreaga (Luis) allegedly injured appellant by causing a truck to hit him. At the time Luis lived in one unit of a duplex with his father, Carlos, and his stepmother, Connie Arreaga (Connie). Erma, Connie’s grandmother, owned the duplex and lived in the other unit.

At all pertinent times Erma was insured by a homeowner’s policy issued by insurer. The policy provided liability coverage for the named insured Erma and for relatives or persons under age 21 “if permanent residents of [her] household.”

Appellant’s attorney made a demand on insurer for the limits of the policy on the theory Luis was a resident of Erma’s household. Insurer disagreed and denied the claim. Appellant obtained a default judgment in excess of $ 1…

Dissenting Opinion

White, J.

I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I conclude there is a triable issue of fact that Erma and Luis are members of the same household. In addition, although the majority have applied the correct *597 definition of “household” in this case, they have done so for the wrong reason. I therefore write to explain my understanding of the correct analysis for arriving at this definition.

In my view, the term “household” is ambiguous and is subject to the normal rules of construction in insurance cases. Because we are construing a coverage clause, this means we must interpret “household” as broadly as is reasonably possible. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 808 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 640 P.2d 764 ].)

A policy provision is ambiguous if it may be interpreted in at least two ways, both of which are reasonable. Whether a policy provision is ambiguous is a question of law. (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 912 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 558 , 718 P.2d 920 ]; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gibson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 176, 181 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 206 ].) Although the majority acknowledge cases which state that the term “household” has “no absolute…

Opinion

Plaintiff and appellant Howard Jacobs (appellant) appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of Fire Insurance Exchange (insurer) after the trial court concluded that the tortfeasor was not a permanent resident of the household of the named insured, Erma Peterson (Erma), and therefore was not insured under her policy. We find no error in the granting of summary judgment and therefore affirm.

Summary. In November of 1986, 18-year-old Luis Arreaga (Luis) allegedly injured appellant by causing a truck to hit him. At the time Luis lived in one unit of a duplex with his father, Carlos, and his stepmother, Connie Arreaga (Connie). Erma, Connie's grandmother, owned the duplex and lived in the other unit.

At all pertinent times Erma was insured by a homeowner's policy issued by insurer. The policy provided liability coverage for the named insured Erma and for relatives or persons under age 21 "if permanent residents of [her] household." [1]

Appellant's attorney made a demand on insurer for the limits of the policy on the theory Luis was a resident of Erma's household. Insurer disagreed and denied the claim. Appellant obtained a default judgment in excess of $1…

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