Suttles

This action raises the questions of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to set aside a default and whether a release form which an employer required to be signed by asbestos removal workers as a condition of employment violates public policy or is otherwise contrary to law. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default, we shall nevertheless reverse the judgment because the release form tendered to the workers as condition of employment violated the statutory prohibition of Civil Code section 1668.

I

Statement of the Case

Baker Pacific Corporation is a licensed asbestos abatement and remediation contractor. Appellants, Thomas M. Suttles and Ralph Runckel, are two individuals who had been employed by Baker Pacific on various asbestos removal projects prior to October 1987. On October 26, 1987, Baker Pacific entered a contract with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the removal of asbestos from an office building owned by Metropolitan located at 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California. As an express condition pre- cedent to awarding the contract to Baker Pacific, Metrópoli…

I respectfully dissent.

I do not find as does the majority that the form of the questioned release “on its face violates the public policy as set forth in Civil Code 1 section 1668”; or that “[b]ecause two workers have refused to execute a written release of liability, the terms of which would necessarily include release of liability for fraud, wilful injury or violation of law (negligent or wilful), they have been denied an employment opportunity.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1154, italics added.)

The pertinent language of the release running to Metropolitan and its agents and officers consists of the releasing party “knowingly assuming] all risks in connection with potential exposure [to] asbestos,” releasing them “from and against any and all liability whatsoever,” and waiving “any and *1158 all claims of every nature . . . related to exposure to asbestos . . . (Italics added.) This language is said to be broad enough to encompass release of liability claims for fraud or willful injury or violation of law, thereby invalidating the release because of the proscription of sections 1668 and 3513.

This record does not reveal that the release presented to appellants was ever contended by…

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

BENSON, J.

This action raises the questions of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to set aside a default and whether a release form which an employer required to be signed by asbestos removal workers as a condition of employment violates public policy or is otherwise contrary to law. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default, we shall nevertheless reverse the judgment because the release form tendered to the workers as condition of employment violated the statutory prohibition of Civil Code section 1668.

Baker Pacific Corporation is a licensed asbestos abatement and remediation contractor. Appellants, Thomas M. Suttles and Ralph Runckel, are two individuals who had been employed by Baker Pacific on various asbestos removal projects prior to October 1987. On October 26, 1987, Baker Pacific entered a contract with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the removal of asbestos from an office building owned by Metropolitan located at 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California. As an express condition pre- cedent to awarding the…