George

This appeal is from an order denying the motion of Robert and Stella George (appellants) to vacate a consent judgment into which they had entered with the City of Glendale (the City).

We must first consider the procedural validity of this appeal. Ordinarily, a consent judgment cannot be attacked. (Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hildebrand (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 859, 861 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 339 ].) An exception exists, however, when the judgment is allegedly void on constitutional grounds, on the theory that such a judgment exceeds the court’s jurisdiction and is subject to attack at any time. (County of Ventura v. Tillett (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105, 110-111 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 741 ]; John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 564, fn. 3 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 231 ].)

In the matter before us, appellants contend that the consent judgment violates their First Amendment rights of expression and association. The City argues the order denying appellants’ motion to vacate the judgment is nonappealable notwithstanding the alleged constitutional exception, because appellants waived their First Amendment rights by consenting to the judgment.

“A waiver of First Amendment rights…