Guardianship of Claralyn S.
Opinion
dissent Opinion
Hanson, J.
I respectfully dissent. The best interests of the child are crucial; they must be decided on the trial level, not by the Court of Appeal. The trial court recognized that Claralyn should not reside with Gary but allowed Gary visitation. As a former stepfather having an interest in Claralyn's welfare, Gary may pursue his visitation right even if declared not to be the natural father. (Civ. Code, § 4601) Claralyn, eight years old, very well could disagree with the court's conclusion to deny admission of the blood tests as she grows older. The trial court has indicated that neither Gary nor Ranona can provide the stable residential setting to which the child is entitled. The trial court should admit the blood test evidence, protect and carefully explain to Claralyn the child's right to continue a relationship with Gary if she wishes, but provide the grandparents an avenue by which to proceed toward permanency in providing a stable home for Claralyn. A public-policy argument supporting the finality of paternity judgments in this case is questionable, recognizing that the majority's conclusion will place child, mother, father and grandparents into a lockstep determination, unassailable…
lead Opinion
Zenovich, J.
OPINION In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether grandparents can collaterally attack the paternity of their grandchild after *Page 83 the purported father's stipulation to paternity in prior actions brought by the county for reimbursement of public assistance expended for the support of the child. Gary S. and Ranona S. lived together for some time prior to early 1975 when a separation occurred and Ranona went to Wisconsin. Thereafter, Ranona returned to California and advised Gary that she was pregnant and he was the father of the child. Although Gary was suspicious, he apparently wanted to believe that the child was his. The child, Claralyn B., was born on October 31, 1975. Ten months later, on September 4, 1976, Gary and Ranona were married and stayed together until September 1977, when they separated. On September 25, 1977, based upon an agreement for entry of judgment of paternity and child support pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11475.1 and 11476.1, the court entered its judgment and order finding that Gary was the natural father of Claralyn. Thereafter, on November 30, 1977, now having reconciled, Ranona and Gary petitioned the court to…
Opinion
Zenovich, J.
In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether grandparents can collaterally attack the paternity of their grandchild after the purported father’s stipulation to paternity in prior actions brought by the county for reimbursement of public assistance expended for the support of the child.
Gary S. and Ranona S. lived together for some time prior to early 1975 when a separation occurred and Ranona went to Wisconsin. Thereafter, Ranona returned to California and advised Gary that she was pregnant and he was the father of the child. Although Gary was suspicious, he apparently wanted to believe that the child was his. The child, Claralyn B., was born on October 31, 1975. Ten months later, on September 4, 1976, Gary and Ranona were married and stayed together until September 1977, when they separated.
On September 25, 1977, based upon an agreement for entry of judgment of paternity and child support pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11475.1 and 11476.1, the court entered its judgment and order finding that Gary was the natural father of Claralyn.
Thereafter, on November 30, 1977, now having reconciled, Ranona and Gary petitioned the court to change…