Opinion

On Januaiy 26, 1976, Philip H. Henderson and Robert Searles, taxpayers of the Los Angeles Unified School District, filed a complaint against the Los Angeles City Board of Education and six of the seven elected members of the board seeking to enjoin the board and its membership from filling a vacancy in office No. 2 of the board by resort to private, nonpublic, secret meetings of the board or any of its committees, for a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties, for restoration of public funds expended in the course of such meetings and for an award of costs and attorney’s fees.

On the date the complaint was filed a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the board from taking any action which was the subject matter of the litigation and setting the matter for hearing February 2, 1976. By stipulation filed January 27, 1976, the hearing was continued to March 2, 1976, for the reason that “Defendants have altered their procedures for selection of a new Board member, thus eliminating the necessity for an immediate hearing.”

On February 2, 1976, the board filed a cross-complaint alleging in pertinent part:

Thereafter by stipulation authorizing issuance of a preliminary injunction and answers to the complaint and cross-complaint the matter became at issue.

In due course, after determining that no defense to the action or triable issue of fact existed, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and attorney’s fees and entered judgment as follows:

“It Is Ordered that the defendants, and each of them, are permanently restrained and enjoined from creating and establishing ad hoc or advisory committees composed solely of members of the governing body of the School District which are less than a quorum of such governing body, which are to meet in closed session to consider, discuss, formulate recommendations, screen applicants for official positions or to meet in closed session for any other aspect of the operation of the School District, except as specifically allowed under Government Code Sections 54957, 54957.6, 54957.9 and Education Code Section 967.

“It Is Further Adjudged And Decreed that plaintiffs and cross-defendants have judgment against defendants and cross-complainants, together with attorney’s fees in the sum of $5,025.00 pursuant to Government Code Section 549605, [sic] (54960.5)] and costs in the sum of $

Defendant board appeals from that judgment.

Contentions

Focusing in general on the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government Code section 54950 et seq. and specifically on section 54952.3 the board contends that, in providing that “all meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the legislative body of a local agency, . .” the Legislature did not intend to include “closed session advisory committees composed solely of members of the Board of Education which are less than a quorum of such board.”

As a corollary of this contention the board further contends that no award of attorney’s fees is authorized by section 54960.5 and in any event the award made was an abuse of discretion.

Issues

The issues before us are succinctly stated by the board as follows:

We note that no reply brief has been filed. The matter will therefore be submitted for decision in accordance with rule 17(b) of California Rules of Court.

Discussion

Taking first things first, we conclude that the Brown Act as amended by the addition of section 54952.3 in 1968 creates an exception to the open and public meeting requirements in case of ad hoc advisory committees comprised solely of members of the governing body of the local agency and which are less than a quorum of the governing body. While it is true that this section defined “legislative body” to include “any advisory commission, advisory committee or advisory body,” it expressly contemplates the exclusion of “a committee composed of members ... which are less than a quorum of such governing body.”

It appears that, even prior to the addition of section 54952.3, the term “legislative body” was interpreted by the Attorney General and the courts to exclude less than a quorum committees. In 1958 the Attorney General opined that less than a quorum committees were excluded ( 32 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 240 (1958)), which opinion was endorsed and quoted from by this court in Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal.App.2d 763, 771 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 805 ], as follows: “ ‘Ordinarily, a committee is composed of less than a quorum of the legislative body that has created it. In those cases the findings of such a committee have not been deliberated upon by a quorum of the legislative body and the necessity, as well as opportunity, for full public deliberation by the legislative body still remains. Thus the public’s rights under the secret meeting law are protected. Therefore, meetings of committees of local agencies where such committees consist of less than a quorum of the members of the legislative body are not covered by the act.’ ” (See also 42 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61 , 64 (1963).)

Responding to the Adler decision, in 1961 the Legislature amended section 54952 and added sections 54952.5, 54952.6 and 54959:

Section 54952: The definition of “legislative body” was amended to include “any board, commission, committee, or other body on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is supported in whole or in part by funds provided by such agency, whether such board, commission, committee or other body is organized and operated by such local agency or by a private corporation.”

Section 54952.5: “As used in this chapter ‘legislative body’ also includes, but is not limited to, planning commissions, library boards, recreation commissions, and other permanent boards or commissions of a local agency.”

Section 54952.6: “As used in this chapter, ‘action taken’ means a collective decision made by a majority of the members of a legislative body, a collective commitment or promise by a majority of the members of a legislative body to make a positive or a negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a legislative body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order or ordinance.”

Section 54959: “Each member of a legislative body who attends a meeting of such legislative body where action is taken in violation of any provision of this chapter, with knowledge of the fact that the meeting is in violation thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

We do not agree with the suggestion that this amendment and these additions extended the act to all committees of the governing body or that two subsequent opinions of the Attorney General (see 43 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen. 36 (1964) and 42 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61 , 65, supra (1963)) disapproved the earlier opinion rendered in 1958. To the contrary we quote from a publication of the Attorney General’s office entitled “Secret Meeting Laws Applicable to Public Agencies” (1972) as follows:

With respect to the award of attorney’s fees, we note that as a general rule such fees are not awardable in the absence of statutory or contractual authority. Although there exists no contractual basis for such an award in this case, Government Code section 54960.5 provides:

Section 54960 provides: “Any interested person may commence an action by mandamus, injunction or declaratory relief for the purpose of stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations of this chapter by members of the legislative body of a local agency or to determine the applicability of this chapter to actions or threatened future action of the legislative body.” Although these sections authorize an award of fees and costs in an action to prevent violations or threatened violations of the Brown Act, the question remains whether it can be said that “it is found that the local agency has violated the provisions of this article.” Under the rules of statutory construction set forth in Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ], we must conclude that attorney’s fees cannot be awarded in the instant case. The statutory language is clear and unambiguous and we have determined that the board has not violated nor threatened to violate any of the provisions of the act.

The judgment is reversed.

Potter, Acting P. J., and Fainer, J., concurred.

Office No. 2 of the board was vacant at that time as the result of the death on January 11, 1976, of one of the board members. This section provides in pertinent part: “As used in this chapter ‘legislative body’ also includes any advisory commission, advisory committee or advisory body of a local agency, created by charter, ordinance, resolution, or by any similar formal action of a governing body or member of such governing body of a local agency. . . . ‘Legislative body’ as defined in this section does not include a committee composed solely of members of the governing body of a local agency which are less than a quorum of such governing body.” At full complement the board consists of seven members. (Ed. Code, § 1225.)' A quorum presumably is a majority of the entire body. (Black’s Law Diet. (4th ed.) p. 1421.) The proposed committees consisting of three members of the board are by definition less than a quorum. As an aid in the determination of legislative intent, the courts give great weight to Attorney General opinions. (Worthington v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal.App.3d 384, 388-389 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.