Slaughter

People v. Slaughter

Caution
194 Cal. App. 3d 95·1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 2023·239 Cal. Rptr. 337
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaAugust 17, 1987A036091California4,474 words

Opinion

lead Opinion

Anderson, J.

Ace J. Slaughter (appellant) pled guilty to a charge of violating section 11352 of the Health and Safety Code. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, imposition of his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation with the condition that he serve 90 days at the Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program (SWAP). When appellant failed to surrender to SWAP on the appointed date, his probation was revoked and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. At the hearing following summary revocation, the court ordered that probation remain revoked and sentenced appellant to prison for the midterm of four years.

Appellant contends that the “court committed error when it failed to state reasons for its decision not to reinstate probation . . . .” He bases this argument on the definition of “sentence choice” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule *97 405(f)) and the requirement of Penal Code 1 section 1170, subdivision (c), which imposes upon the court a duty of stating reasons for its sentence choice. We hold that the sentence to prison following probation revocation herein does not require an accompanying statement of reasons and, therefore, we decline to remand for resentencing.

The Initial…

035concurrenceinpart Opinion

Poche, J.

I concur. I agree that by reason of his two prior felony convictions defendant was statutorily ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)) 1 and I further agree that under *100 those circumstances the trial court had no obligation to state a reason for its sentencing choice of state prison for the middle term. That result is correct because (1) where one is statutorily ineligible for probation, the trial court is not required to explain why it is choosing state prison over probation (see, e.g., People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 523 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 234 ]), and (2) imposition of the middle term, rather than the upper or lower term, does not require a statement of reasons (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 439(c)). But I totally disassociate myself and dissent from the dicta in the majority opinion which declares that a statement of reasons is never required when the court terminates probation and imposes a state prison term following revocation of probation where imposition of sentence had initially been suspended. (See majority opn., ante, pp. 98-99.) That broad statement is an incorrect statement of the law.

A sentence choice is “the…

Opinion

Ace J. Slaughter (appellant) pled guilty to a charge of violating section 11352 of the Health and Safety Code. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, imposition of his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation with the condition that he serve 90 days at the Sheriff's Work Alternative Program (SWAP). When appellant failed to surrender to SWAP on the appointed date, his probation was revoked and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. At the hearing following summary revocation, the court ordered that probation remain revoked and sentenced appellant to prison for the midterm of four years.

Appellant contends that the "court committed error when it failed to state reasons for its decision not to reinstate probation...." He bases this argument on the definition of "sentence choice" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(f)) and the requirement of Penal Code [1] section 1170, subdivision (c), which imposes upon the court a duty of stating reasons for its sentence choice. We hold that the sentence to prison following probation revocation herein does not require an accompanying statement of reasons and, therefore, we decline to remand for…

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