MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner David W. Martin (“Martin”) appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (a), and we affirm.

Even though Martin did not forfeit any work-time credits as a result of the disciplinary finding, we have jurisdiction because the Board of Parole will consider the charge when it evaluates Martin’s eligibility for parole. See Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir.2004) (“[H]abeas corpus jurisdiction exists when a petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole.”) (citation omitted) (alterations omitted); see also 15 CaLCode Regs. § 2402(c)(6).

Martin contends that the senior hearing officer’s 2005 decision finding him guilty of mutual combat without serious injury violated due process. We conclude that the state court’s conclusion that some evidence supports the decision was not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 , 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 , 105 S.Ct. 2768 , 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).

Because we find that some evidence supports the disciplinary charge, we need not address whether California’s refusal to recognize Martin’s claim of self-defense violates “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).

Martin’s request for judicial notice is granted.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. . We certify for appeal, on our own motion, the issue of whether the 2005 decision following the prison disciplinary hearing finding Martin guilty of mutual combat violated due process.