Opinion

Petitioner, The Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. (Free Press) appeals a .judgment denying a writ of mandate and an injunction to require respondents—the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Chief of Police, the County of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff— to issue press identification cards to Free Press reporters. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law disclosé the nature of the cause:

Police Power. Petitioner does not contend that peace officers in the furtherance of public order and safety cannot reasonably restrict the number of persons crossing police lines at the scene of a crime or disaster. Nor does petitioner contend that the sheriff and the Los Angeles Chief of Police have set up police lines and denied the general public full access to newsworthy events at times when public order and safety did not call for such restrictions. (Even if such a contention had been made it would be of doubtful relevance, for here petitioner seeks to obtain a priority of access superior to that of the general public.) Rather petitioner contends that its liberty has been arbitrarily restricted and it has been denied equal protection and due process of law by the adoption and operation of a restrictive policy which violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

First Amendment. Does petitioner’s status as the publisher of a weekly paper give petitioner under the First Amendment a right of access to the scenes of crimes and disasters superior to that of the general public? The answer, derived from a multitude of cases, is a clear no, and the trial court so held. (Worthy v. Herter (1959) 270 F.2d 905 , 907-909 [ 106 App. D.C. 153 ]; Tribune Review Co. v. Thomas (3d Cir. 1958) 254 F.2d 883 ; Trimble v. Johnston (D.C. 1959) 173 F.Supp. 651, 655-656 ; United Press Associations v. Valente (1954) 308 N.Y. 71 [ 123 N.E.2d 777 ]; State v. Buchanan (1968) 250 Ore. 244 [ 436 P.2d 729 ]; New York Post Corp. v. Moses (1960) 23 Misc.2d 826 [ 204 N.Y.S.2d 44, 53-56 ]; Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 754-755 [ 300 P.2d 163 ].) Restrictions on the right of access to particular places at particular times are consistent with other reasonable restrictions on liberty based upon the police power, and these restrictions remain valid even though the ability of the press to gather news and express views on a particular subject may be incidentally hampered. (Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 179, 189-191 , 85 S.Ct. 1271 ]; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 [ 85 L.Ed. 1049 , 61 S.Ct. 762 , 133 A.L.R. 1396 ]; Garland v. Torre (2d Cir. 1958) 259 F.2d 545, 548-549 .)

Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection. If restrictions imposed on the public by the use of police lines do not deprive members of the public of their liberty without due process of law, and if petitioner, despite its press status, has no greater right to cross police lines than other members of the public, has petitioner nevertheless been denied equal protection of the laws by the operation of a policy which grants priority to cross police lines to those members of the press who regularly report police and fire news? We think not. Because of the necessity in terms of public order and safety to restrict access to certain events, respondents could either deny the right to cross police lines to all members of the public, or they could distinguish between members on some reasonable basis. Regular coverage of police and fire news provides a reasonable basis for classification of persons who seek the privilege of crossing police lines. It is true, as petitioner points out that, respondents could have defined the class of persons to be given priority in crossing police lines by some other standard. Indeed, respondents probably could have granted the privilege of crossing police lines on a first-come-first-served basis. However, the issue under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is whether the classification upon which the unequal treatment rests is a reasonable one. The equal protection clause “[does] not prevent classification . . . [or] require [uniform treatment] . . . with respect to persons or things which are in fact different.” (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 388-389 [ 196 P.2d 773 ].) “A classification is reasonable ... if there are differences between the classes and the differences are reasonably related to the purpose of the [government in providing differing treatment].” (Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers, 35 Cal.2d 121, 131 [ 216 P.2d 825 , 13 A.L.R.2d 252 ].) Here, the purpose of granting priority to some to cross police lines is to allow the public to gain information about crimes, fires, disasters, and the like, without jeopardizing public order and safety in the process. This purpose is served by a classification of members of the public into those who regularly report such events in the public media and those who do not and by a grant of priority to those who so report. The classification is a reasonable one for constitutional purposes, even though other classifications might have achieved the same result.

Cases relied upon by petitioner to support its argument that it has been denied equal protection of the laws, Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal.2d 51 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 430 , 434 P.2d 982 ]; Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536 [ 171 P.2d 885 ]; and Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma (1969) 76 Wn.2d 63 [ 455 P.2d 350 ], are inapposite for two reasons: first, they involve limitations on advertising or public meetings in instances where the need for such limitations had not been shown; second, the limitations were connected with the content of the ideas to be advertised or to be discussed. Here, the distinction between petitioner’s employees and the recipients of press passes was not based on the ideas expressed in their reporting but rather on the need to cross police lines in the regular course of their business, a need which the trial court found less pressing for petitioner’s employees than for recipients of press passes. We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s view that respondents issued press passes to those who reported police, and fire events with some regularity, and respondents did not base their actions on the content of such reportage.

Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process. Petitioner contends that it was denied due process of law because the power to issue press passes had not been delegated by law to the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, and because there were no legally determined guidelines for the issuance of such passes. But in seeking a writ of mandate petitioner has tacitly recognized the sheriff’s authority to issue press passes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Additionally, the argument lacks persuasiveness because the sheriff has a duty imposed by sattute to enforce the laws of the state and maintain public order and safety, and such duty implicited carries the authority to limit public access to certain events. (See Gov. Code, §§ 26600, 26602, 26620 et seq. and Pen. Code, § 409.5.) Clearly, the sheriff has discretion to permit or not permit certain persons to cross police lines, and the record before us fails to establish that he exercised his dscretion unreasonably.

Petitioner makes the same argument about the lack of legislatively determined guidelines for the issuance of press passes by respondent Los Angeles Chief of Police. Section 52.16(A) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code declares that the Board of Police Commissioners is authorized to issue press passes to press representatives of daily newspapers or news services. Section 52.17 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code gives the Board reasonable discretion to limit the number of press passes and to deny press passes. Here again, the record fails to establish that in denying press passes to petitioner’s employees the chief of police exercised his discretion unreasonably or in violation of the Municipal Code.

Fourteenth Amendment—Arbitrary Discrimination. As a final argument petitioner contends that even if the standards for press passes were reasonable, they were arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied against petitioner’s interest because of its editorial policy. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 [ 30 L.Ed. 220, 227-228 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 ].) Essentially, this argument raises an issue of fact. The trial court found that respondents did in fact issue press passes on the basis of whether the applicant was a person who regularly covered police and fire news, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain that finding.

The judgment is affirmed.

Roth, P. L, and Herndon, 1, concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 1970, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 30, 1970. Wright, C. J., did not participate therein.