The defendants, Charles I. Romano, Emilio Aquilante, and Daniel Bozyk, were jointly charged with the burglary of Seiler’s Men’s Store in Bakersfield and in a second count with grand theft from the same establishment. The jury found Romano and Aquilante guilty on both counts and Bozyk guilty on the second count only. The de fendants appeal from the judgments and from the denial of their motions for a new trial.

Defendants contend, first, that the corpus delicti of the crimes charged in the information was not proved; secondly, that the court committed reversible error by receiving in evidence certain statements of the defendants made shortly after their arrest; and thirdly, that the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct.

On the morning of July 7, 1960, the three defendants, trailed by two Los Angeles police officers, drove a yellow Mercury automobile on Highway 99 from Los Angeles to Bakersfield; upon arrival, the defendants made a left turn on 19th Street to H Street, turned left again to 18th Street and went two blocks east to Chester Avenue; they parked at 17th Place and I Street near an alley, put on their suit coats, glanced in the rearview mirror, and straightened their neckties; Aquilante combed his hair. The three defendants then walked to Seiler's Men’s Store and entered. The Bakersfield Police Department had been alerted and joined the Los Angeles police officers in maintaining a surveillance. One officer entered the store and posted himself in the rear of the room. He saw the men by the suit racks; one of them (Bozyk) brought with him a brief case, the partitions of which had been removed; he placed it on the floor out of the line of vision of the witness; one of the other men took some clothing from the suit rack and made a gesture toward the brief ease. The store manager testified that he saw Romano and Aquilante there; no sale was made to any of the defendants, and, in fact, only one sale of a suit, to another person, was made during the day.

Defendants left the store; Bozyk was carrying the brown leather brief ease; one officer testified that it bulged more than when the three defendants had gone inside; another officer described it as “considerably thicker” ; a third policeman said that it was then “so full it appeared to be round.” Bozyk walked out of sight while Romano and Aquilante stood in front of the store momentarily and then returned to the car where they placed the brief ease in the trunk. They then drove about eight blocks and parked two blocks away from the original parking spot. Again, they got out of the car, walked two blocks north to 20th Street, and separated. Bozyk walked north; Romano and Aquilante went back toward the car, secured a cardboard box, got in the car, drove to 20th Street, picked up Bozyk and drove at high speed to a deadend. They opened the trunk of the car, got back in the car, drove onto Highway 99 and started south toward Los Angeles.

When they left Bakersfield Aquilante was driving; Romano was seated in the right front seat; and Bozyk in the rear of the car. A Bakersfield police officer followed about two ear lengths behind. He saw Romano drop something out of the car; he stopped their vehicle one-fourth of a mile north of the town of Greenfield and found six new suits on hangers in a pile on the floor, the labels having been torn from the clothing. The now empty brief case was also in the automobile.

Pour suit labels were found along the route taken by the defendants, three on that day and one the next day, all in the vicinity of 3rd Street and Highway 99 in an island portion of the highway.

Defendant Aquilante, when questioned at the time of his arrest, said he was a clothing jobber from Los Angeles. When his attention was called to the fact that all the labels had been removed from the garments found in the ear, Aquilante showed the police officer that the label was also missing from the suit he was wearing. He claimed that the suits had been bought from a clothing outlet store and that they were to be sold to any available purchaser.

Seiler’s Store was unable to determine if any specific item received by it from the manufacturer was missing, as they maintained only a cost and retail inventory; instead of keeping track of specific garments, they merely deducted from the value of their remaining stock all sales actually made. They carried Pinkus Brothers clothing, and Seiler’s was the only store in Bakersfield which did so. The suits taken from the car were identified by a representative of Pinkus Brothers by comparing the clothing to swatches retained by the manufacturer and by the labels. He testified that each manufacturer has its own set of numbered labels. The cloth used in suits has lot numbers, and the shipping orders record these numbers. Pinkus Brothers had done business with Seiler’s for many years, and from the shipping orders the manufacturer’s representative could testify that the garments with these lot numbers had been shipped to Seiler’s between September 1959 and May 1960. Proof was made that these goods were received by Seiler’s.

An expert criminologist testified that he discovered part of the tag letters of the name “Seiler’s” still inside the lining of one of the suits; in his opinion two of the recovered coat labels had at one time been sewn in two of the suits. All of the suits were size 40 or 42, and each would retail for $69.50 to $75.

The police demonstrated to the jury that all of the clothing and hangers would go into the brief case.

It is, of course, essential in a charge of burglary to prove that the defendant entered the building with the specific intent to commit theft or some felony; as applied to theft, the intent must be to deprive the owner permanently of his property. Because of the particular inventory system used by Seiler’s, the store manager could not say that a certain specific number of suits was missing on the day of the crime, but he did testify that the suits found in the defendants ’ automobile were the type sold in the store, that the two labels found were Seiler’s labels, and that this was the only store in Bakersfield carrying that brand.

People v. Corral, 60 Cal.App.2d 66, 71 [ 140 P.2d 172 ] holds:

In People v. Brannon, supra, 30 Cal.App.2d 445, 446 [ 86 P.2d 842 ] the defendant entered a café, and, having removed the glass coverings on two slot machines, appropriated 97 dimes and 23 nickels therefrom; the burglary conviction was affirmed, for,

People v. Corral, supra, 60 Cal.App.2d 66, 71 [ 140 P.2d 172 ] also considers proof of specific intent on the part of the defendant, saying:

The appellants, in stressing their claim that the necessary intent to prove burglary was not shown, rely on cases in which the circumstances of the alleged offenses made intent uncertain. (P eople v. Brown, 105 Cal. 66 [ 38 P. 518 ] ; In re Connell, 68 Cal.App.2d 360 [ 156 P.2d 483 ] ; and People v. Garrow, 130 Cal.App.2d 75 [ 278 P.2d 475 ].) In the Brown case, supra, there was evidence that defendant took a bicycle, that he was a 17-year-old boy who did this to “get even,” and that he never intended to keep it permanently. The Connell case, supra, determined that a conviction in Utah which did not charge the defendant with taking an automobile with intent to deprive the owner of title or possession did not fall within the classification of cases which could be utilized to justify the sentencing of a defendant as an habitual criminal. In the Garrow case, supra, it appeared that the defendant was a friend of the owner of a bar; that he worked for him, had driven his car, had slept in the same building and had eaten at the same table; he was entrusted with the keys to the Cadillac car of the complaining witness and the keys to the bar, and he had been shown a gun owned by a previous owner of the bar; when it was discovered that the Cadillac and the gun were gone, he maintained that he had borrowed both the gun and the ear.

But in the present ease there can be no doubt that in taking the clothing the defendants intended permanently to deprive the owner of the property. When apprehended they were headed back toward Los Angeles; they denied that they had taken the clothing from Seiler’s, claimed that Aquilante had bought it elsewhere and said they intended to sell it.

People v. Tims, 171 Cal.App.2d 671, 674 [ 341 P.2d 56 ] holds: ‘ ‘ The element of entry, like any other element of the corpus delicti, need not be proved by direct, positive evidence, but may be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,” citing People v. Sparks, 82 Cal.App.2d 145 [ 185 P.2d 652 ].

Here there was direct as well as circumstantial evidence in the record, and the proof of burglary and grand theft was amply sufficient. (See People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481 [ 29 P. 1026 ] ; People v. Brittain, 142 Cal. 8 [ 75 P. 314 , 100 Am.St. Rep. 95] ; People v. Smith, 145 Cal.App.2d 149 [302 P.2d 63]; People v. McClure, 133 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 284 P.2d 887 ]; People v. Kellner, 67 Cal.App.2d 477 [ 154 P.2d 425 ]; People v. McCann, 34 Cal.App.2d 376, 377 [ 93 P.2d 643 ].)

Appellants contend that the court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence concerning the questioning of the defendants by police officers soon after their apprehension. It should be noted at the outset that there is no claim that there was police brutality or coercion or other mistreatment of the defendants; what they said was said freely and voluntarily.

Police custody does not in itself make such evidence inadmissible (People v. Gotham, 185 Cal.App.2d 47, 55 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 20 ]), and fair police questioning may take place even after a request for counsel. (Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 [ 78 S.Ct. 1287 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 ].)

The statement of Romano was as follows:

As to Aquilante, the record shows:

The ground upon which such evidence is admitted is that the conduct of a defendant in the face of an accusatory statement may aid the jury in determining his guilt or innocence. (People v. Long, 7 Cal.App. 27 [ 93 P. 387 ] ; People v. Jolley, 35 Cal.App.2d 159 [ 94 P.2d 1011 ]; People v. Teshara, 134 Cal. 542 [ 66 P. 798 ] ; People v. Bringhurst, 192 Cal. 748 [221 P. 897]; People v. Richardson, 83 Cal.App. 302 [ 256 P. 616 ]; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 486-487 [ 229 P. 40 ].)

Evidence of an accusation alone or of an accusation followed by a specific denial by a defendant is, however, hearsay and inadmissible. (People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325 [ 86 P. 671 ]; People v. Teshara, supra, 134 Cal. 542 [ 66 P. 798 ] ; People v. Wong Loung, 159 Cal. 520 [ 114 P. 829 ] ; People v. Vogel, 36 Cal.App. 216 [ 171 P. 978 ] ; People v. Wignall, 125 Cal.App. 465 [ 13 P.2d 995 ]; People v. McCoy, 127 Cal.App. 195 [ 15 P.2d 543 ] ; People v. Bob, 29 Cal.2d 321 [ 175 P.2d 12 ] ; People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 [ 172 P.2d 18 ] ; People v. McEvers, 53 Cal.App.2d 448 [ 128 P.2d 93 ]; People v. Butler, 118 Cal.App.2d 16 [ 257 P.2d 109 ] ; People v. Staker, 154 Cal.App.2d 773 [ 316 P.2d 725 ].)

If a denial of guilt is coupled with additional statements or equivocal or evasive responses the evidence is properly received. (People v. Carmelo, 94 Cal.App.2d 301, 306-307 [ 210 P.2d 538 ] ; People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69 [ 173 P.2d 11 ] ; People v. Wade, 71 Cal.App.2d 646 [ 163 P.2d 59 ] ; People v. Bradley, 23 Cal.App. 44 [ 136 P. 955 ]; People v. Kazatsky, 18 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 63 P.2d 299 ] ; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal.App.2d 614 [ 151 P.2d 288 ] ; People v. Wilson, 61 Cal.App. 611, 621 [ 215 P. 565 ] ; People v. Gordon, 61 Cal.App. 98 [ 214 P. 276 ] ; People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128 [ 263 P. 226 ] ; People v. Krug, 10 Cal.App.2d 172 [ 51 P.2d 445 ] ; People v. Brown, 87 Cal.App.2d 281 [ 196 P.2d 936 ] ; People v. Mandell, 48 Cal.App.2d 806 [ 120 P.2d 921 ] ; People v. Trotter, 120 Cal.App. 54 [ 7 P.2d 731 ] ; People v. Morgan, 87 Cal.App.2d 674 [ 197 P.2d 413 ] ; People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d 661, 670 [ 276 P.2d 801 ].) And where, besides a denial, the defendant makes an assertion of fact which is contradicted by other evidence or makes false, evasive or contradictory statements, the evidence is admissible for such weight as the trier of fact may give it. (People v. Philbon, 138 Cal. 530 [ 71 P. 650 ] ; People v. Wilson, supra; People v. Goltra, 115 Cal.App. 539 [ 2 P.2d 35 ] ; People v. McCoy, supra, 127 Cal.App. 195 [ 15 P.2d 543 ]; People v. Cole, 141 Cal. 88 [ 74 P. 547 ]; People v. Turner, 1 Cal.App. 420 [ 82 P. 397 ]; People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal.App.2d 748 [ 106 P.2d 84 ]; People v. Hickok, 56 Cal.App. 13 [ 204 P. 555 ].) A statement by a defendant, in the face of an accusation, that he has nothing to say is in no sense a denial, and the evidence is admissible. (People v. Egan, 77 Cal.App. 279 [ 246 P. 337 ]; People v. McCoy, supra. ) And where an accusation is partly admitted and partly denied, the entire conversation is properly received. (People v. Trotter, supra.)

“It is for the court in the first instance to determine whether the import of the statements is such that it would furnish a foundation for proof of conduct, and it is then for the jury to decide whether the accused was aware the statements were made, whether, under all the circumstances shown, they called for a disclaimer, whether the accused did reply to them, and whether if he did not do so, such failure showed criminal intent or a consciousness of guilt.” (People v. Yeager, supra, 194 Cal. 452, 486 [ 229 P. 40 ].) (See also People v. Chavez, 50 Cal.2d 778 [ 329 P.2d 907 ].)

A basic complaint of defendants ’ counsel now seems to be that “in effect” their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated. That objection was not made in the trial court; there it was claimed only that the general effect of the answers was a denial of the charges and that the admitted testimony constituted hearsay. Consequently, that point cannot be raised for the first time on the appeal. (People v. Carter, 192 Cal.App.2d 648, 661 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]; People v. Hurst, 36 Cal.App.2d 63, 65 [ 96 P.2d 1003 ]; People v. Kozakis, 102 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [ 228 P.2d 58 ]; People v. Odom, 72 Cal.App.2d 72, 74 [164 P.2d 68]; People v. Pickens, 190 Cal.App.2d 138, 148 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 795 ].)

Considering the objections to the statements of Romano and Aquilante on the grounds urged during the trial, we must first inquire whether the answers and conduct of Romano and Aquilante were evasive and equivocal in any particular. Romano said: “I have no comments, not at the moment, until I speak to my attorney.”

And Aquilante said: “No comment.” . . . “Well, I want to see my lawyer. I don’t understand what is talked here. Maybe my lawyer will understand it a little better than I do.”

The tag phrase “no comment” is usually resorted to by statesmen or politicians when hard pressed by inquiring reporters ; it means, “I do not affirm, I do not deny, I have nothing to say at this time.” These answers were certainly equivocal and evasive and were admissible.

We must then inquire further whether the objections made in the court below to other parts of the statements were sufficiently pinpointed to make them available to defendants on the appeal.

The objections below were, without exception, general and went to the whole of the statements and not to any specific part of them. An objection to a statement or document offered in evidence, part of which is admissible, must be specifically directed to the inadmissible portion. (People v. Pickens, supra, 190 Cal.App.2d 138, 148 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 795, 801 ] ; People v. Lang Transportation Corp., 43 Cal.App.2d 134, 140-141 [ 110 P.2d 464 ] ; McCormick on Evidence, pp. 119-120.) The requirements of this rule were not observed by counsel, and consequently they cannot now claim error in the admission of the full statement.

It is the general rule that in the absence of a timely and proper objection in the trial court, alleged error cannot be urged on appeal. (People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 401-402 [ 326 P.2d 457 ] ; People v. Millum, 42 Cal.2d 524, 528 [ 267 P.2d 1039 ]; People v. Scaggs, 153 Cal.App.2d 339, 356 [ 314 P.2d 793 ]; People v. Gaines, 192 Cal.App.2d 128, 131-134 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 359 ].)

It should be noted in passing that nowhere in the remarks made by any of the defendants was there a statement that he refused to answer on the ground it might tend to incriminate him (People v. Calhoun, 50 Cal.2d 137, 147 [ 323 P.2d 427 ]), or that he refused to answer on the advice of counsel (People v. Abbott, 47 Cal.2d 362, 373 [ 303 P.2d 730 ] ; People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 229, 239 [ 187 P.2d 706 ]).

We believe, furthermore, that no prejudice was suffered by defendants by the admission of the evidence objected to, because proof of the commission of the offenses by the defendants was so clear and convincing that the testimony complained of could not have changed the result. (People v. Terry, 180 Cal.App.2d 48, 60 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 597 ] ; People v. King, 114 Cal.App.2d 95, 103-105 [ 249 P.2d 563 ] ; People v. Duarte, 183 Cal.App.2d 393, 401-402 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 711 ] ; People v. Simmons, supra, 28 Cal.2d 699, 721 [ 172 P.2d 18 ].)

The entire statement of Bozyk was clearly admissible, because he made false averments of fact which he himself admitted were not true when he testified.

“Falsehoods and deceptions or inconsistent and conflicting statements by a defendant as to a matter relevant to the issues are admissible against him as indicating a consciousness of guilt. ...” (Fricke, California Criminal Evidence (5th ed. 1960), Falsehood, p. 80.)

The defendants also assign as error three alleged instances of misconduct of the district attorney.

The first was the development on cross-examination of Bozyk that he had been previously arrested for a misdemeanor ; this was not improper in view of his testimony on direct examination by his own counsel that he had never been arrested before. (People v. Buckley, 143 Cal. 375, 389-390 [ 77 P. 169 ] ; People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 227-229 [ 223 P.2d 223 ]; People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 479 [ 190 P.2d 9 ].)

Next, defendants complain of the following portion of the district attorney’s closing argument:

The district attorney was apparently egged on by disparag ing remarks in the argument of defendants’ counsel; his reply is therefore understandable, but not justifiable. No prosecuting officer has a right to go outside the record in arguing the guilt of a defendant. (People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 721-727 [ 249 P.2d 1 ] ; People v. Beal, 116 Cal.App.2d 475, 477 [ 254 P.2d 100 ] ; People v. Quigley, 157 Cal.App.2d 223, 227-229 [ 320 P.2d 936 ] ; People v. Bell, 138 Cal.App.2d 7, 13-14 [ 291 P.2d 150 ] ; People v. Shaffer, 150 Cal.App.2d 287, 294 [ 309 P.2d 475 ].)

However, defense counsel made no objection to the district attorney’s argument and no motion for an instruction by the court relative to the error.

“ As stated in People v. Berryman (1936), 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [ 57 P.2d 136 ], ‘The general rule regarding misconduct of the district attorney which tends to and is likely to result in prejudice to the defendant is that where no objection is made to such misconduct by the defendant, or where objection is made and the court sustains the objection and properly admonishes the jury, the misconduct claimed to be prejudicial to defendant’s rights will not furnish grounds sufficient to justify the granting of a new trial or the reversal of the judgment. [Citation.] There are two exceptions to this general rule. One is where the ease is closely balanced and there is grave doubt of defendant’s guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as to contribute materially to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results requiring a reversal. [Citation.] The other exception is where the act done or remark made is of such a character that a harmful result cannot be obviated or cured by any retraction of counsel or instruction of the court. In such cases the misconduct will furnish ground for a reversal of the judgment, even where proper admonitions are given by the court. [Citations.]’” (People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [ 324 P.2d 556 ].)

If an objection had been made, it seems probable that an admonition by the court would have completely relieved the impropriety. (People v. Chavez, supra, 50 Cal.2d 778, 793 [ 329 P.2d 907 ].) We are convinced that the error was not of sufficient weight or importance in the circumstances to justify a reversal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §4½.)

Lastly, defendants complain of the reference of the district attorney in his argument to the failure of Romano to testify. This comment was within proper limits and was admissible. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 486-490 [ 165 P.2d 3 ]; People v. Sauer, 163 Cal.App.2d 740, 746-747 [ 329 P.2d 962 ] ; Pen. Code, § 1323.)

The judgments and orders denying the motions for a new trial are affirmed.

Brown, J., and Stone, J., concurred.