made an order appointing the Bank of California as eon servator of the affairs of Truitt Matthew Stewart. That order was made on the petition of Mr. Stewart’s wife, consented to by him, on the ground that he had suffered a serious heart attack which made it impossible for him to attend to his business affairs. On September 13, 1968, Mr. Stewart filed a petition for termination of the conservatorship', alleging that he had recovered from his heart condition to such an extent that he could manage his own affairs. The petition was opposed by appellant Omansky and by the Union Bank; neither Mrs. Stewart, the conservator, nor anyone else objected. The trial court, dismissed the objections, and made its order terminating the conservatorship. Omansky has appealed; the Union Bank has not. We affirm the order insofar as it dismisses the objections ; we dismiss the appeal in other respects.

The concern of Omansky and of the Union Bank arises out of an involved series of transactions concerning the financing and construction of a large apartment house. It was the contention of both of the objectors that the conservatorship estate and the conservator bank in its individual capacity were liable to them in substantial which Mr. Stewart and the conservator disputed. At the time of the order herein appealed from the lawsuits resulting from that dispute remained undetermined.

The trial court entered what is denominated “Findings and Order Determining Conservatorship, ’ ’ reading as follows:

Omansky here objects to the fact that the trial court made “Findings” in a matter where it had dismissed his objections, contending that, if he and the Union Bank had no standing to object to the termination of the conservatorship, there were no objections remaining before the court and that, therefore, there was no reason to make an order denying their objections nor authority to make findings of fact in what had become a default' proceeding. We need not determine the interesting issues thus injected. Since we hold that the trial court was correct in ruling that neither Omansky nor the Union Bank had standing to oppose the termination of the conservatorship; Omansky has suffered no judicially cognizable wrong by an order made in a proceeding to which he was not a party.

The parties have treated us to semantical essays based on the fact that, by express words, a creditor is not among those who may petition for a conservatorship (Prob. Code, § 1754), whereas the section (Prob. Code, § 1755) which de.als with petitions to terminate an existing conservatorship is silent on that point. But the action of the trial court rests on a basis more sound than semantics. The sole purpose of a conservatorship is to provide a competent person to. act, under the guidance of the probate court, as the agent of the conservatee. No title to the conservatorship estate vests in the conservator. When a conservatorship is created, whatever rights exist against the conservatee continue against the estate; when it is terminated, whatever rights existed against the estate continue against the restored to capacity to defend himself.. By the same token, if the conservator, in his or-its individual capacity, has wronged a third person by actions taken in the course of the conservatorship, its individual liability .continues after the termination. Any order discharging the conservator, and settling his or its accounts, operates only as between the ex-conservator and the ex-conservatee. Since that is so, it follows that no one has a legal interest- in the termination of the conservator except someone (the statutory language is “relative or friend”) who is interested in the personal well being of the eonservatee and wishes to see that he is not placed, again, in a position where he may be imposed on.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order herein involved do no more than to set forth results which the law would have imposed even without them; in no way does the order harm Omansky or afféct his rights.

Ill

The respondent urges us .to dismiss the appeal, arguing that, since the order did not and could not, affect Omarnsky’s rights as against either Mr. Stewart or The Bank of California, he is not a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the order dismissed him as an objector. We think that, although Omansky was not an authorized objector, he had, and has, "a right to have his status determined. As his counsel points out, Omansky’s formal objections to termination included a denial of the allegation that Mr. Stewart had been restored to capacity. If Omansky had been a person entitled to oppose the petition, he would have had a right to litigate that issue. It is only because he had no legal standing before the court that he could not dispute the claim that Mr. Stewart’s heart had recovered. To the extent that he was prevented from litigating a proper issue he is “aggrieved” by the portion of the order which dismissed him from the proceeding. In other, words, a party is “aggrieved” by an order, within the meaning of section 902, even though his grievance turns out to be legally without merit.

The portion of the order appealed from which determines that Leon Omansky was not a person qualified to' object to the termination of the conservatorship is affirmed; the appeal from the other portions of the order is dismissed.

Piles, P. J., and Dunn, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied October 2, 1969, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 12, 1969.

And, of course, vice versa.