This is an appeal by plaintiffs [i.e. purchasers] from a judgment of dismissal in an action wherein plaintiffs sought specific performance of and damages with reference to a sales agreement for the purchase of real property.

The pertinent facts will be set forth under the various contentions. The first issue is whether the contract for the sale and purchase of the subject real property is specifically enforceable. The trial court indicated in its statements from the bench that, among others, one of the grounds for sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss was that the contract in question lacked mutuality of remedy. The contract provides in pertinent part as follows:

The trial judge further stated:

The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed the within action because of plaintiffs’ failure diligently to prosecute under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 583.

The discretion to dismiss is that of the trial court and it will be disturbed only in the case of manifest abuse (Abner Corporation, Inc. v. Lushing, 212 Cal.App.2d 597 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 207 ].)

The trial judge said from the bench: “I am also of the opinion, in view of the whole file, that there has been an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action. Under all the circumstances, I think the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action should be, and it is, granted. ’ ’

An examination of the whole record negatives any conclusion that there was any abuse of discretion upon the part of the trial court. In defendants’ declaration in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint it is asserted in substance that the within action has been pending since March 28, I960; that it was reset for pretrial for July 19, 1962, and for trial October 8, 1962; that the time to trial from the filing date would be over two and one-half years; that it has' been set and reset for pre-trial as follows: In 1960, October 3 and 23; in 1961, May 8, June 9, July 12, July 28 and September 21; and in 1962, March 21, June 28, July 19; that practically all of the settings were initiated by the defendants and not the plaintiffs and no motion to set had been made by the plaintiffs since June of 1961.

Under the circumstances no useful purpose would be served in discussing appellants’ further point that the trial court erred in not permitting appellants to amend their complaint to assert a cause of action for damages.

The judgment is affirmed.

Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied November 19, 1963, and appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 18, 1963.

Code of Civil Procedure, section 583, provides in pertinent part as follows: “The court may in its discretion dismiss any action for want of prosecution on motion of the defendant and after due notice to the plaintiff, whenever plaintiff has failed for two years after action is filed to bring such action to trial. . . .”