This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment against it in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $23,177.22 on account of its alleged liability under a public liability insurance policy.

The facts shown by the record are, in general substance, as follows: Columbia Southern Chemical Corporation, plaintiff and respondent herein, operates a soda ash manufacturing plant to which buyers send trucks to obtain the product. Re spondent was insured against public liability by Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (hereinafter referred to as “North”), with a $25,000-deductible clause. T. Gai Warehouse Company (hereinafter called “Gai”) operated certain trucks and was insured against public liability by Manufacturers and Wholesalers Indemnity Exchange, a reciprocal exchange, defendant and appellant herein. Leslie Goddard was the driver of one of Gai’s trucks, which he drove to respondent’s plant to pick up a load of soda ash, on March 29, 1956. The loading operation was conducted by driving the truck to respondent’s delivery machinery, there parking it, and receiving the ash into the body of the truck through a flexible spout maintained by respondent. The operative procedure of loading involved control by an employee of respondent of a conveyor belt by which the ash was deposited through the flexible spout. The truck operator directed the spout into that portion of the truck unfilled, the spout being so constructed that it could be moved from one hatch of the truck to another as the respective compartments were filled. The entire proceeding was on the premises and apparently under the general directive control of respondent. Respondent had a rope attached to the flexible loading spout for convenience in moving the spout from one hatch to another and to lift the spout out of the hatch after the loading was completed.

Goddard, in accordance with loading practice followed on many previous trips, drove to the spout, parked, and received the load of ash. An employee of respondent controlled delivery of the ash through the spout. When he had received all the ash his truck would hold, Goddard attempted to use the rope to lift the loading spout out of the hatch. The rope was so worn and frayed that it unexpectedly broke. Goddard fell backward from the truck and thereby received very serious injuries. He brought an action against respondent for damages on account of these injuries, and alleged that respondent was negligent in the maintenance of the defective rope and that the injuries were the proximate result of such negligence. He asked for damages in the amount of $150,000. Respondent transmitted the summons and complaint to appellant, claiming coverage as an insured under the public liability policy issued by appellant on Gai’s trucks. This claim was predicated on the fact that the injury had been allegedly caused in the process of loading, and on the coverage clauses contained in appellant’s policy. These clauses, insofar as here pertinent, provide as follows:

Appellant refused to defend on the ground that the complaint did not show any facts requiring it, under the terms of the policy, to defend respondent. North, because there was a potential liability in excess of its $25,000-deductible clause and also because its policy provided for defense regardless of the amount claimed, was forced to defend, and employed counsel therefor, with an ultimate cost to it for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $2,177.22. In the course of that suit a settlement was negotiated with Goddard and paid by respondent in the amount of $21,000.

Respondent then brought this action against appellant, claiming the right to reimbursement as an insured under the policy issued to Gai, a portion of which is above quoted, and alleging, in general substance, the basic facts above outlined. Appellant herein answered and admitted most of the general facts hereinbefore related, but set up as a defense in Tiaec verba the provisions of the policy and the complaint for damages by Goddard against respondent herein. Appellant claims that the face of Goddard’s complaint against respondent did not disclose any liability which appellant herein was required to defend under the terms of the policy.

The pertinent portions of the Goddard complaint which we must here consider for purposes of determining whether or not there was any initial showing of potential liability which appellant was required to defend, are as follows: Paragraphs I, II, III and IV relate to respondent’s corporate existence and fictitiously named defendants, respondent’s employees acting in the scope of employment, and respondent’s maintenance and operation of the soda ash manufacturing. Paragraphs V and VI read as follows:

Paragraphs VII, VIII, IX and X allege the injuries to be the proximate result of respondent’s negligence, and describe the injuries and damage.

A second cause of action repleads all of the first cause of action plus setting up paragraph II, which reads as follows:

The cause was tried and judgment was rendered for respondent, from which this appeal is taken.

Duty to Defend

Appellant first contends that the duty to defend under the policy must be measured entirely by the policy provisions and the factual allegations of the complaint bringing or failing to bring the cause within the perimeter of the policy coverage. As a general, basic principle, we agree with this contention. (Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co., 3 Cal.App.2d 624, 630 [2] [ 40 P.2d 311 ] ; Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Surety Co., 37 Cal.App. 540, 544 [ 174 P. 110 ] ; Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal.App.2d 84, 90 [4] [ 295 P.2d 19 , 57 A.L.R.2d 1379 ] ; Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal.App .2d 245, 250 [1] [ 286 P.2d 1000 ] ; Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 583, 586 [1a] [ 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 ].)

However, modern procedure has made for so much greater-flexibility or plasticity in pleading that this rule must be applied with extreme care to include all the potentialities of the pleading and the policy coverage, and an insurer who refuses to defend does so at its own peril, for it may well develop that, due to such plasticity of pleading, the events referred to in the complaint were, in fact, covered by the policy. As was said in Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., supra, at page 251 [3, 4] :

In Journal Publishing Co. v. General Casualty Co., 210 F.2d 202, 209 [5], the court comments:

In Firco, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 173 Cal. App.2d 524, 527, 528, 529 [ 343 P.2d 311 ], the court discusses "the same problem in the following language:

It has long been the rule that in construing an insurance policy, any uncertainty or ambiguity in the policy issued by an insurer must be construed most strongly against such insurer and in favor of the insured. (Goorberg v. Western Assurance Co., 150 Cal. 510, 515 [ 89 P. 130 , 119 Am.St.Rep. 246 , 11 Ann.Cas. 801, 10 L.R.A. N.S. 876] ; Fageol T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 18 Cal.2d 731, 747 [17] [ 117 P.2d 661 ] ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 437 [12] [ 296 P.2d 801 , 57 A.L.R.2d 914 ] and cases there cited.) This same rule of construction has many times been applied in favor of a third party using the insured vehicle with the consent of the named assured. (Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 548 [5-6] [ 184 P.2d 153 , 173 A.L.R. 896 ]; Sly v. American Indem. Co., 127 Cal.App. 202, 207 [2] [ 15 P.2d 522 ]; Pleasant Valley etc. Assn. v. Cal-Farms Ins. Co., 142 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [1-3] [289 P.2d 109]; City of Santa Monica v. Royal Indem. Co., 157 Cal. App.2d 50, 54 [1-10] [ 320 P.2d 136 ].)

“Using,” “Loading and Unloading”

The term “using,” when used in a policy without restrictive terms, must be understood in its most comprehensive sense. It does not require that the injury be the direct and proximate result in any strict legal sense of the active movement of the motor vehicle covered by the policy. The term “loading and unloading” must be understood as expanding the coverage intended by the word “use” or “using,” and is not a term of restriction as used in this policy. The policy with which we are here involved contains no words of limitation pertinent to the matters here under consideration. Again, it is not necessary that the injury be directly and proximately caused, in the strict legal sense, by the activities of the motor vehicle itself. Obviously, when the motor vehicle is at rest for loading and unloading, there can be little, if any, activity of the motor vehicle proper. Thus, in applying the coverage paid for by the insurance premium, the term “loading and unloading” has been applied to cover many phases of that operation which do not involve direct activity of the vehicle. (General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Hanley Oil Co., 321 Mass. 72 [ 72 N.E.2d 1 , 171 A.L.R. 497 ] [overflow of fuel oil in cellar on delivery] ; American Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 630, 635 [1] [ 235 P.2d 645 ] and numerous cases there cited [escape of oil from terminal facilities after delivery from truck]; Employers etc. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal.App.2d 369, 375 [2] [ 334 P.2d 658 ] [piling dropped from load crane, crane not a part of truck].) We are convinced that in construing the term “using” as expanded by the specific provisions of the policy to include “loading and unloading,” the respondent was “using” the truck.

Application of Pleading Criteria

We think it sufficiently clear in the pleading in the Goddard complaint that Goddard was on premises exclusively controlled by respondent, that respondent’s loading facilities were used, and that respondent was potentially involved in the active loading (as did in truth later appear from the evidence). As was remarked in Ritchie v. Anchor Gas. Go., supra, the complainant suing the insured is interested in his own recovery. He is not interested in the niceties of the insured’s policy protection. He will ordinarily draft his complaint as best suits his own recovery. It is not his business to so draft his complaint as to make it clear that it is within insured’s policy coverage. It appears to us, however, in the ease here at bar, that any reasonably intelligent person can see from the Goddard complaint that the question of respondent’s activity, participation in or control over the loading would most probably be an issue in that case. As was said in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 660 [12] [ 328 P.2d 198 ] :

In the case here at bar, lifting the loading spout out of the hatch was a part of the process of loading, in which respondent actively participated through providing and controlling the ash and equipment that delivered. The furnishing of a defective rope which Goddard was expected to use was as much negligence as though respondent’s employee had negligently swung the loading spout and knocked Goddard off. Our concern here is whether or not the negligence causing the injury was an integral part of the loading operation and whether the allegations of the complaint reasonably can be said to convey to appellant notice of such potential claim by plaintiff.

In the state of the record before us, appellant must be held to have refused defense at its own peril. The very thing that an ordinarily reasonable reader can envision in the Goddard complaint, viz., that respondent was actively involved in the loading operation, turned out, in fact, to be true. We think it is clear that there appeared sufficient potential liability under the policy coverage to place appellant on notice.

Settlement

Having concluded that, under the pleadings here involved, there was a duty to defend, appellant’s refusal was wrongful. If there is a wrongful refusal to defend, the insurer loses his right to control the litigation, and is liable for any reasonable settlement arrived at in good faith thereunder and paid by insured. If a settlement is made by the insured, the question of whether or not the facts of the case come within the policy coverage is still open and may be determined on evidence adduced in the trial in which the insured seeks to recover from the insurer. Under such circumstances, the insurer becomes liable for any reasonable settlement made in good faith, and for the insured’s costs and expenses necessarily incurred in defending. (Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., supra, 631 [5]; Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., supra, 250 [2], 258 [20]; Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App.2d 776, 785-786 [7] [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; Chrysler Motors v. Royal Indemnity Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 785, 788 [1] [ 174 P.2d 318 ]; Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., supra, 661 [14].)

Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Appellant complains that it ought not be compelled to pay respondent’s costs and attorney’s fees because such costs and attorney's fees were admittedly paid by North, whose policy coverage is conceded by respondent to contain an unequivocal promise by North to defend, regardless of the amount sued for. The fact that North’s policy had a $25,000-deductible clause, which forced respondent to pay the $21,000 settlement to Goddard, and the legal results thereof, have already been discussed. If it had also been forced to pay the costs and attorney’s fees, we have no doubt respondent would have the right to recover those also. (Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., supra, 660 [12].) However, it did not do so.

The effect of recognizing the subrogation here claimed would be only to repay North and to reimburse it for having fulfilled its contractual duty. This was an independent duty that existed irrespective of appellant’s policy. Subrogation is an equitable doctrine that the law recognizes and applies for the purpose of securing justice between the parties. (Employers etc. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal.App.2d 369,376 [3] [ 334 P.2d 658 ].)

North, in defending, was at all times protecting not only respondent but its own interest in regard to amounts potentially recoverable in excess of the $25,000-deductible clause. It received full value on its own account for the attorney’s fees and costs expended. While at first glance there would appear to be some similarity with the rights of contribution which accrue to coinsurers where both have paid indemnity, a closer analysis makes clear that the indemnification clauses and the defense clauses are entirely different. Indemnity merely promises the payment of money. The defense clause promises the rendition of services requiring the insurer to investigate, conduct the defense, and at times to negotiate and make settlements. These are duties each insurer is required to perform without regard to what the other insurer is doing. It, of course, frequently happens that both join together and share expenses, but that is not compulsory. Each is acting with legal independence of the other. Neither is excused to any extent from its full duty to defend regardless of what course is taken by the other, so that the duty to defend is entirely personal to each particular insurer. It has no legal power to divide its obligation with the other, nor to compel contribution from the other. (Financial Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 132 Cal.App.2d 207, 210 [2] [281 P.2d 883]; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Church, 107 P.Supp. 683, 689 [14]; Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 94 F.2d 710, 712 [4] ; American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania etc. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453, 458 [1].)

Points raised under other headings by appellant and respondent are sufficiently covered in the foregoing discussion.

It follows from the foregoing that the judgment is correct insofar as it awards respondent the $21,000 paid by it to Goddard, but is in error as to the $2,177.22 paid by North for attorney’s fees and expenses in defense.

The judgment is modified by striking therefrom the amount of $2,177.22, leaving a recovery to respondent in the amount of $21,000. As so modified, it is affirmed. Each party will bear its own costs on appeal.

Griffin, P. J., and Coughlin, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 10, 1961.