This appeal is by the plaintiffs from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in an action for refund of sales tax. The action for refund of sales tax was pursuant to section 6933 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

The question presented is whether the sale by a manufacturer (in this ease several manufacturers) of the entire business, including office furniture and machinery used as part of the manufacturing operation, is subject to sales tax, and if so, whether it is constitutional.

The cause was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of facts and the facts as set forth therein, and found by the court to be true, are in pertinent part as follows:

The trial court, in addition to finding the facts set forth in the stipulation to be true, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law :

Appellants' first contention is that “The Single Sale of the Entire Assets of a Going Business Is an Occasional Sale and Is Exempt From Sales Tax Under Section 6367 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.’’

Section 6367 provides: ‘ ‘ There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this part the gross receipts from occasional sales of tangible personal property and the storage, use, or other consumption in this State of tangible personal property, the transfer of which to the purchaser is an occasional sale.’’

The substance of appellants’ contention is that the sale of the entire business must be deemed an occasional sale since none of the appellants were in the business of selling their businesses.

In support of this position, appellants cite authorities from other jurisdictions and one California superior court decision. It is interesting to note that two of the authorities relied upon, Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga.App. 755 [ 81 S.E.2d 222 ] and State v. Dyson, 89 Ga.App. 791 [ 81 S.E.2d 217 ], were expressly rejected in Market St. Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal.App.2d 87 [ 290 P.2d 20 ]. Mr. Justice Peters, speaking for the court, stated at pages 97-98:

The liquidation sale in the Market St. Ry. Co. case, supra, occurred prior to the enactment of section 6367. The taxability of a liquidation sale made subsequent to the enactment of section 6367 was decided in Sutter Packing Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 139 Cal.App.2d 889 [ 294 P.2d 1083 ]. In Sutter, the taxpayer contended that the liquidation sale was an isolated transaction since Sutter was not engaged in the business of selling its business. The court in rejecting this contention stated at pages 895-896 :

The fact that appellants sold their entire businesses does not per se mean that such sales constituted occasional sales. The Legislature has expressly set forth what does constitute an “occasional sale” in section 6006.5. (See footnote 5.) The Legislature further provided that “Except where the context otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter govern the construction of this part.” (§ 6002.)

The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the “occasional sales” exemption is limited by the specific language of section 6006.5. It was stated in Pacific Pipeline Constr. Co. v. State Board Equalization, supra, 49 Cal.2d 729 , 735:

Factually, the sales by appellants do not come within subdivision (a) of section 6006.5. It has been expressly stipulated by the parties, and found to be true by the trial court, that the sales in question, to the extent they were taxed, consisted of machinery, tooling, equipment, furniture, fixtures, trucks and automobiles, “. . . theretofore used by the respective sellers in their aforsaid manufacturing and selling operations, and thereafter used by TTSI for purposes other than resale in the regular course of business, i.e., in conducting similar manufacturing and selling operations.” (Paragraph 11 of stipulation of facts.) It was further stipulated that each of the selling corporations in fact held a seller’s permit in relation to such manufacturing and selling activity. (Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of stipulation of facts.) The trial court found (Finding VI) that “All of the property included in each of the sales in question was held and used by the selling corporation in the course of an activity for which said selling corporation was required to hold, and did in fact hold, a seller’s permit.” In addition, each sale in question was one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit. (See paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of stipulation of facts.)

It is equally clear that the sales in question were not “occasional sales” within the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 6006.5.

Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the stipulation of facts show that there existed no affiliation between USI and any of the selling corporations prior to the sales in question, and that after said sales, the selling corporations held small minority interests in USI, i.e., the ownership was not “substantially similar to that which existed before such transfer.”

Appellants’ next contention is that the imposition of a sales tax upon these sales violates the “. . . Equal Protection of the Laws Guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution and by Article I, Sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution.”

In support of their position appellants state, “It is clear that no tax would be payable if a business concern not required to hold a sales tax permit, such as a seller of food products, had made a single sale of its machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures.” This statement has no relation to the facts presented in the case at bar. The property included in each of the sales in question was held and used by the selling corporation in the course of an activity for which said selling corporation was required to hold, and did in fact hold, a seller’s permit. (Finding VI.) Each of the final sales in question was one of a series sufficient in number, scope, and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit. (Finding VII.) Thus, the selling corporation would have been taxable under the law even if they had conducted businessses not otherwise requiring the holding of sellers’ permits. (See Market St. Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equalization, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d 87 ; Sutter Packing Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d 889 , which involved a food processing business exempt under § 6359.)

In Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal.App.2d 720 [ 57 P.2d 1022 ], the Retail Sales Tax Act was attacked on the ground that it contravened the United States and California Constitutions by unreasonably discriminating with respect to different classes of business to which it applied. The allegedly invalid discriminations were those between retail and wholesale merchants, tangible and intangible personal property, and exempted and nonexempted tangible personal property. The court in sustaining the validity of the tax stated at pages 732-733:

It is possible to think of situations where one business may be subjected to a tax upon a certain retail sale whereas another business would not be taxed for a similar sale. For example, in Rigsby v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 860 [ 118 P.2d 289 ], a printer was taxed upon a single sale of an item of capital equipment. A person engaged in a purely “service” type of business may not have been taxed upon such a single sale. However, the Supreme Court indicated that arguments for the exemption of sales different in kind from those ordinarily made “must be directed to the Legislature rather than to the courts” and thereby implied that such a distinction did not involve any constitutional limitation upon the Legislature’s power.

For the reasons stated the judgment is affirmed.

Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied February 5, 1962, and appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 7, 1962.

All references to code sections will be to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless indicated to the contrary. Sections 6015 and 6019 provide in pertinent part: “§6015. ‘Retailer.’ ‘Retailer’ includes: ‘ ‘ (a) Every seller who makes any retail sale or sales of tangible personal property, and every person engaged in the business of making retail sales at auction of tangible personal property owned by the person or others. ’ ’ “§6019. [Retailer; persons included; number of sales:] “Every individual, firm, copartnership, joint venture, trust, business trust, syndicate, association or corporation making more than two retail sales of tangible personal property during any 12-month period, including sales made in the capacity of assignee for the benefit of creditors, or receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, shall be considered a retailer within the provisions of this part in his or its individual, firm, copartnership, joint venture, trust, business trust, syndicate, associate or corporate capacity.’ ’ Section 6007 provides in part: “§ 6007. ‘Retail sale’: ‘Sale at retail.’ “A ‘retail sale’ or ‘sale at retail’ means a sale for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business in the form of tangible personal property. . . .’’ Section 6051 provides in part: “§ 6051. [Levy on retailers’ gross receipts; rate.] “For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail a tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers at the rate of . . .’’ Section 6006.5 provides: “§ 6006.5. [Occasional sale; real or ultimate ownership:] ‘ ‘ ‘ Occasional sale ’ includes: “ (a) A sale of property not held or used by a seller in the course of an activity for which he is required to hold a seller’s permit, provided such sale is not one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit; “(b) Any transfer of all or substantially all the property held or used by a person in the course of such an activity when after such trans fer the real or ultimate ownership of such property is substantially similar to that which existed before such transfer. Por the purposes of this section, stockholders, bondholders, partners, or other persons holding an interest in a corporation or other entity are regarded as having the ‘real or ultimate ownership’ of the property of such corporation or other entity. ’ ’ Subdivision (a) of section 6006.5 provides: “ ‘Occasional sale’ includes: “(a) A sale of property not held or used by a seller in the course of an activity for which he is required to hold a seller’s permit, provided such sale is not one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and character to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller’s permit. ’ ’ Subdivision (b) of section 6006.5 provides: ‘ ‘ ‘ Occasional sale ’ includes “(b) Any transfer of all or substantially all the property held or used by a person in the course of such an activity when after such transfer the real or ultimate ownership of such property is substantially similar to that which existed before such transfer. For the purposes of this section, stockholders, bondholders, partners, or other persons holding an interest in a corporation or other entity are regarded as having the ‘real or ultimate ownership’ of the property of such corporation or other entity.”