This is an appeal by defendant from that portion of a judgment in favor of plaintiff, which decrees existence of a public easement along the northerly border of defendant’s property.

Pleading and Findings

Plaintiff’s complaint in essence pleads plaintiff’s residence and land ownership; defendant’s land ownership; the physical existence for more than 10 years over a described course across defendant’s land of the road in question; the open and continuous use thereof by the public during all of that time; that they used it during all of that time, as a public road; its use by plaintiff as a meays of ingress and egress to plaintiff’s land; obstruction of the road by defendant without right shortly before commencement of the action.

The trial court found that the allegations of the complaint are true, but made no detailed or specific findings of fact beyond that.

Facts

The roadway easement in question runs east and west adjacent to and south of the north line of defendant’s land; plaintiff’s land lies adjacent to and north of defendant’s land.

While there is considerable conflict in the testimony, it clearly is sufficient to support the conclusion that the road in question was used openly and continuously by all members of the public having occasion to do so from 1941 to 1957 without let or hindrance from anyone. Some of the testimony was hearsay, but was received without objection and this stands as evidence. (Merchant etc. Assn. v. Kellogg E. & D. Co., 28 Cal.2d 594, 599 [4] [ 170 P.2d 923 ].) We cannot weigh the evidence on this appeal. (Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal.2d 567, 583 [1, 2] [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 349 P.2d 289 ].)

Findings

Defendant contends that the finding that the road to the width of 18 feet was openly and continuously used for more than 10 years last past as a public road and that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest were afforded means of ingress and egress thereby to plaintiff’s property is insufficient to support the judgment declaring a public road or easement over the way in question.

In support of this contention he cites Bartholomew v. Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 844, 854 [6] [ 195 P.2d 824 ], which analyzes a similar problem in connection with the meaning and application of that portion of Political Code section 2621 enacted in 1883, which portion reads as follows:

The court there said on the subject in question,

However, the principles controlling dedication and acceptance by long continued public user and the inference that such user is not by license are set forth by a long line of authorities in California.

In Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62 [ 11 P. 879 ] at page 66, the Supreme Court says,

In Schwerdtle v. County of Placer, 108 Cal. 589 [ 41 P. 488 ] at page 593 it is said,

In Franz v. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205 [ 63 P. 361 ], the Supreme Court, citing many authorities, arrives at the same conclusions. In Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28 [ 87 P. 908 ] at page 30 it is said,

The entire problem is thoroughly analyzed in the later cases of Arnold v. City of San Diego, 120 Cal.App.2d 353 [ 261 P.2d 33 ] and Union Transp. Co. v. County of Sacramento, 42 Cal.2d 235 [ 267 P.2d 10 ], and the same principle is adhered to.

Defendant cites Lantz v. City of Los Angeles, 185 Cal. 262 [ 196 P. 481 ], and Union Transp. Co. v. County of Sacramento, supra, to the effect that mere user is insufficient. However, we do not have “mere user.” The situation in the case at bar is recognized in the Lantz case, where it is said at page 268 [2],

It will be noted that the Supreme Court’s attention in the Union Transp. Co. case was directed to the problem of county liability and its discussions therein contained were intended to solve that problem. The court did not disapprove the cases cited to the effect that public user may constitute acceptance of the road by the public. It carefully pointed out (p. 243) that those cases did not involve contentions of responsibility for maintenance on the political subdivision involved.

In Hartley v. Vermillion, 141 Cal. 339 [ 74 P. 987 ], at pages 348 and 349, the court analyzes the problem of statutory terminology regarding public and private roads and says,

A further clarification of the intent involved in Streets and Highways Code 904 and 941 is found in the enactment in 1955 by our Legislature of the second paragraph of said section 941 as follows,

It will be noted also that when Political Code section 2621 was transposed to Streets and Highways Code section 904 its wording was changed from “public road or byway” to “county highway.” Thus, it is clear that the sections as they now stand do not interfere with the common law rule, except to protect the political subdivision from responsibility where it has not formally accepted the road as a county highway.

While the finding is certainly short of perfection, we think that in view of the pleadings, the issues and the evidence, it sufficiently meets the necessary requirements to support the judgment. Cases which have criticized such findings have been coupled with an absence of sufficient evidence to support the ultimate elements found even by the use of inferences above noted.

Other points made by the parties are sufficiently covered by the foregoing discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Griffin, P. J., and Coughlin, J., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 12, 1962.