Russell Johnson, Iii v. Lucent Technologies Inc.

Good Law
653 F.3d 1000·2011 WL 3332368·112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1549·25 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 7·94 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,251
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 4, 201109-55203California5,412 words

Opinion

Opinion

Fletcher, J.

This case requires us to decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to claims “arising under an Act of Congress enacted” after December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 , or by the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state. Section 1981 retaliation claims were foreclosed by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), and then made again possible by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Because they arise under a post-December 1, 1990 Act of Congress, section 1981 retaliation claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations under § 1658. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

I. Employment Relationship and Prior Litigation

Prior to 1986, Johnson, an African American, was employed by Lucent’s predecessor, AT & T Bell Laboratories, in Pennsylvania. In 1986, Johnson took disability leave on grounds of mental disability. In 1987, Johnson was terminated.

In 1989, Johnson, pro se, sued Lucent for disability benefits in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The…

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