22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T49d,MEMORANDUM Bennie Dixon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest and excessive force claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Dixon’s false arrest claim because the undisputed facts indicate that probable cause existed to arrest Dixon. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (to prevail on the merits of a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest”). The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Dixon’s excessive force claim based on qualified immunity because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers used an unreasonable amount of force in subduing him, and “a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed[.]” Luchtel, 623 F.3d at 982-83 . AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4cf,

MEMORANDUM

Bennie Dixon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest and excessive force claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Dixon’s false arrest claim because the undisputed facts indicate that probable cause existed to arrest Dixon. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (to prevail on the merits of a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Dixon’s excessive force claim based on qualified immunity because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers used an unreasonable amount of force in subduing him, and “a reasonable officer could have thought the force used was needed[.]” Luchtel, 623 F.3d at 982-83 .

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.