Langford

Langford, the appellant, was convicted of violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 398 [now § 2421]. The indictment was in two counts. Count One charged the transportation of a woman, one Carol Jones, in foreign commerce, from Los Angeles County, California, to Tiajuana, Mexico, for purposes of prostitution, debauchery and other immoral practices. The second count charged transportation of the same woman, for the same -purposes, from *50 Tiajuana to Los Angeles County. Conviction was on Count Two only.

The evidence showed that at the time of the transportation mentioned in Count One, the parties went to Mexico to be married there, and that the transportation charged in Count Two was their return trip. It is urged upon this appeal that notwithstanding the evidence of prior and subsequent prostitution, the entire trip, both going and returning, was an innocent one under the rule of Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 , 64 S.Ct. 1037 , 88 L.Ed. 1331 . Therefore, it is said, the verdict is against law, and not supported by the evidence.

It is also contended that the judgment must be reversed because of certain remarks made by the prosecutor including comment upon failure of the…

178 F.2d 48 LANGFORD, v. UNITED STATES. No. 12156. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. Oct. 27, 1949. Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1949. Henry G. Bodkin, Jr., William K. Stewart, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. James M. Carter, U.S. Attorney, Ernest A. Tolin, Chief Asst., Norman Neukom and Ray M. Steele, Asst. U.S. Attorneys, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee. Before DENMAN, BONE and POPE, Circuit Judges. POPE, Circuit Judge. 1 Langford, the appellant, was convicted of violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 398 (§ now 2421). The indictment was in two counts. Count One charged the transportation of a woman, one Carol Jones, in foreign commerce, from Los Angeles County, California, to Tiajuana, Mexico, for purposes of prostitution, debauchery and other immoral practices. The second count charged transportation of the same woman, for the same purposes, from Tiajuana to Los Angeles County. Conviction was on Count Two only. 2 The evidence showed that at the time of the transportation mentioned in Count One, the parties went to Mexico to be married there, and that the transportation charged in Count Two was their return trip. It is urged upon this appeal that…

Upon Petition for Rehearing

Upon petition for rehearing it is urged that our decision runs counter to Oriolo v. United States, 324 U.S. 824 , 65 S.Ct. 683 , 89 L.Ed. 1393 . There, by memorandum opinion, the Court reversed United States v. Oriolo, 3 Cir., 146 F.2d 152 , on the authority of Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 , 64 S.Ct. 1037 , 88 L.Ed. 1331 .

As pointed out by Judge Biggs, dissenting from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the parties there simply took a day’s outing at Atlantic City, New Jersey, all the time intending to resume the prostitution at Philadelphia. It was thought by Judge Biggs that the fact that defendant lost his car at Atlantic City, and that as they left New Jersey on the return trip by train he remarked to the woman that she must earn money for him so he could recover his car did not demonstrate a sufficient change of purpose to distinguish the case from the Mortensen case. He thought the difference between transportation to earn money for defendant to recover his car and transportation to earn money for him, was too trivial to be significant. Evidently the Supreme Court agreed.

What we have previously said with respect to the whole…