City of Downey v. Gonzales
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Stephens, J.
This appeal arises from an order for costs after judgments in an action in eminent domain brought by the City of Downey for the purpose of building a municipal hospital. Under one complaint, multiple parcels were sought to be condemned. Multiple persons had interests in various parcels. Some persons had interests in multiple parcels. Each person with an interest in any parcel was named as a defendant. The appellants here, 28 in number, are but a portion of the named defendants. The parcels involved here are 15 in number, and are but a portion of the total number of parcels condemned. Of the 15 parcels, there are 3 wherein there is a *565 single interested person, and 2 of these 3 parcels belong to the same person. Of the remaining 12 parcels, there are 8 parcels-wherein there are 2 interested persons. As to the 4 remaining parcels, there are 3 parcels with 3 interested persons, and 2 of these parcels have the same 3 interested persons involved. The last parcel has 6 persons interested therein.
As to the 15 parcels being here condemned, there are but 13 independent litigated causes. The multiple condemnation of the numerous parcels stands in court, then, in the same posture as…
Concurring Opinion
Aiso, J.
I concur in the judgment and the supportive conclusions of law reached by Justice Stephens in the principal opinion. I should like to clarify that the separation into multiple defendant units is based upon actions and not causes of action. Set forth herein are certain additional considerations for allowing more than one single daily witness fee and mileage for all eight days. The results reached are compelled by the record in this case. The plaintiff opposing the allowance of the witness fees claimed has interposed only defenses in law; the facts relevant to the disposition of the appeal have not been controverted.
The fact that Snorgras 1 was retained by the defendants; that he was in attendance in court upon seven days pursuant to subpoena and upon the eighth day pursuant to request of the defendants; that he in fact testified for each defendant claiming witness fees; that each such defendant has obligated himself to pay Snorgras an expert witness’ fee for each day of his attendance in court; that each defendant claiming witness fees has actually paid to Snorgras the witness fees and mileage claimed; and that his attendance on the eight days was necessary in testifying or…
Dissenting Opinion
Kaus, J.
Dissenting. I agree that defendants were entitled to a witness fee and mileage for the eighth day and I also agree that the trial court properly struck the item for expenses incurred with respect to the photographs. I do not agree that defendants were entitled to more than one witness fee for any day when their expert was in court, although he may have attended as a witness on behalf of more than one party.
Witness fees are allowed for attending court, not for testifying. (Gov. Code, § 68093; Prichard v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 Cal.App.2d 701, 706 [ 51 P.2d 426 ]; Starmont v. Cummins, 120 Mich. 629 [ 79 N.W. 897 ]; Healy v. Hillsborough County, 70 N.H. 588 [ 49 A. 89 ]; 97 C.J.S. p. 421.)
Whether the expert witness manifested himself to the court in 28, 15 or 13 capacities, he was there only once and entitled to but one fee. The statement in Justice Stephens’ opinion that no defendant other than the one who subpoenas the witness could have called him without obligating himself to an additional fee is quite unsupported by authority 1 and disregards the purpose for which the fee is paid; yet even if the witness is entitled to multiple fees for being in the courtroom just once, I can…
Opinion
This appeal arises from an order for costs after judgments in an action in eminent domain brought by the City of Downey for the purpose of building a municipal hospital. Under one complaint, multiple parcels were sought to be condemned. Multiple persons had interests in various parcels. Some persons had interests in multiple parcels. Each person with an interest in any parcel was named as a defendant. The appellants here, 28 in number, are but a portion of the named defendants. The parcels involved here are 15 in number, and are but a portion of the total number of parcels condemned. Of the 15 parcels, there are 3 wherein there is a single interested person, and 2 of these 3 parcels belong to the same person. Of the remaining 12 parcels, there are 8 parcels wherein there are 2 interested persons. As to the 4 remaining parcels, there are 3 parcels with 3 interested persons, and 2 of these parcels have the same 3 interested persons involved. The last parcel has 6 persons interested therein. [fn. 1]
As to the 15 parcels being here condemned, there are but 13 independent litigated causes. The multiple condemnation of the numerous parcels stands in court, then, in the…