Shaver

Shaver v. Clanton

Good Law
1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 688·26 Cal. App. 4th 568·31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595·94 Daily Journal DAR 9469·94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5206
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaJune 30, 1994G013816California7,047 words

Opinion

Opinion

This case of first impression requires us to analyze every first-year law student's worst nightmare: the rule against perpetuities. (1) "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." (Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 201, p. 191.) As one sage stated in 1916 regarding the rule's applicability, "Before we pull the heavens down, let us sit and think a little." [1] It has been said, "The rule against perpetuities is as clear and distinct as any other rule which has ever been declared by the court.... No difference of opinion exists as to [its] terms...." [2] Another commentator was perhaps more accurate, however, when he observed, "The rule ... is one upon which the authorities refuse to come to any semblance of agreement as to its reason for existence." [3]

At issue is whether a lease amendment which provides for perpetual options to renew is void because it violates the rule. Until 1991, California law applied the rule to commercial transactions and, accordingly, to options to renew. That changed with the adoption of the Uniform Statutory Rule…

lead Opinion

Sonenshine, J.

— This case of first impression requires us to analyze every first-year law student’s worst nightmare: the rule against perpetuities. (1) “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” (Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 201, p. 191.) As one sage stated in 1916 regarding the rule’s applicability, “Before we pull the heavens down, *571 let us sit and think a little.” 1 It has been said, “The rule against perpetuities is as clear and distinct as any other rule which has ever been declared by the court. ... No difference of opinion exists as to [its] terms . . . ." 2 Another commentator was perhaps more accurate, however, when he observed, “The rule ... is one upon which the authorities refuse to come to any semblance of agreement as to its reason for existence.” 3

At issue is whether a lease amendment which provides for perpetual options to renew is void because it violates the rule. Until 1991, California law applied the rule to commercial transactions and, accordingly, to options to renew. That changed with the adoption of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against…

concurrence Opinion

Crosby, J.

Concurring. — The majority opinion reaches a correct result, but the holding is hornbook law and hardly worthy of publication. (See, e.g., 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Real Property, § 550, pp. 719-720; Civ. Code, § 718.) Moreover, open-ended leases and options in perpetuity must be about as common as polar bear sightings in Death Valley. The Court of Appeal is not likely to see another such case in the next 99 years.

A petition for a rehearing was denied July 22, 1994, and the petition of appellant Donna Shaver for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 14, 1994.

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