Betsworth

Introduction

“Fair trials,” wrote Hugo Black, “are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.” (In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 137 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 947 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ].) One does not need to go to law school to know, as Black wrote in the same opinion, that “. . . no man can be a judge in his own case.” (Id. at p. 136 [ 99 L.Ed. at p. 946 ].)

The area of the law where judges are most likely to end up presiding over their own cases is contempt of court, where they will be both prosecutor and judge. The justification is practical necessity. Judges must act swiftly to protect court proceedings from disruption or one party’s attempt to gain an unfair advantage (see e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania (1974) 418 U.S. 506, 513 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 912, 920 , 94 S.Ct. 2687 ] [summary contempt power based on need to protect the “integrity of the trial process in the face of an ‘actual obstruction of justice’ ”]), and there may not be enough time to send for another judge to conduct a minitrial on every such disruption or attempt.

On the other hand, not every contempt of court strikes at the process of justice. The…