Phillips

In this criminal case the trial court did not define reasonable doubt. Nor did it instruct the jury about the defendant’s presumption of innocence, or the People’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court’s omission constitutes a structural constitutional defect and compels reversal per se.

David Phillips appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of inflicting corporal injury upon his cohabitant, Barbara O. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and unlawfully taking her vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)).

During its questioning of one of the prospective jurors the trial court mentioned that Phillips was presumed innocent, and that the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “whatever he’s alleged to have done.” The trial court, however, neglected to define “reasonable doubt.”

The prosecution referred to its burden of proof once during opening statements. Both prosecution and defense counsel referred to the correct burden of proof throughout their closing remarks to the jury. In addition, both counsel gave partial definitions of “reasonable doubt” to the jury in closing argument, although they…