Noriega
People v. Noriega
Opinion
lead Opinion
Johnson, J.
*314 Opinion
A jury found appellant, Daniel Noriega, guilty of one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 246.) He claims the trial court committed reversible error by granting his request to represent himself without adequate warnings as required by Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ]. In addition, he claims the trial court committed reversible error by relieving standby counsel in the absence of due process, and in denying his request for a continuance to prepare for trial. We conclude the court’s failure to properly advise appellant of the risks and dangers of self-representation resulted in prejudicial error. We therefore reverse on this ground alone.
Facts and Proceedings Below
On February 2, 1996, Loretta Granados sat at her kitchen table near a large window facing the street. She saw her niece, Naomi Vega, drive up in her van and pull into the driveway. Two older boys ran out of the van. Vega exited carrying a sleeping five-year-old boy.
After Vega put the boy in a bed in Granados’s home, Granados asked Vega where she left the baby. Vega replied the baby was still asleep in the car and that she was going to get…
concurrence Opinion
Woods, J.
I agree with my colleagues the judgment must be reversed because of Faretta (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ]) error that cannot be deemed harmless under Chapman (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]). I write separately to suggest a way to minimize recurring Faretta appeals and appellate Faretta inconsistency.
The starting point is Faretta: “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [ 95 S.Ct. at p. 2541 ].)
Faretta did not specify what dangers and what disadvantages the defendant should (not must) be made aware of. Our California Supreme Court has been similarly unspecific. For example, People v. Bloom, after quoting the above Faretta language, states: “The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements…
Opinion
A jury found appellant, Daniel Noriega, guilty of one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 246.) He claims the trial court committed reversible error by granting his request to represent himself without adequate warnings as required by Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ]. In addition, he claims the trial court committed reversible error by relieving standby counsel in the absence of due process, and in denying his request for a continuance to prepare for trial. We conclude the court's failure to properly advise appellant of the risks and dangers of self-representation resulted in prejudicial error. We therefore reverse on this ground alone.
On February 2, 1996, Loretta Granados sat at her kitchen table near a large window facing the street. She saw her niece, Naomi Vega, drive up in her van and pull into the driveway. Two older boys ran out of the van. Vega exited carrying a sleeping five-year-old boy.
After Vega put the boy in a bed in Granados's home, Granados asked Vega where she left the baby. Vega replied the baby was still asleep in the car and that she was going to get him.