Morrow

Morrow v. Superior Court

Good Law
1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 1253·30 Cal. App. 4th 1252·36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210·94 Daily Journal DAR 17407·94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9470
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaDecember 9, 1994B085297California4,054 words

Opinion

Opinion

Yegan, J.

It has been said, and it is doubtless true, that the “. . . courtroom is a temple of justice.” (Featherstone v. United States (5th Cir. 1974) 491 F.2d 96 , 97, fn. 1.) A prosecutor may not use the courtroom as a place to intentionally and surreptitiously listen to, i.e., eavesdrop upon, a defendant’s conversation with his attorney. Indeed, eavesdropping on an attorney-client conversation is inappropriate anywhere and cannot be tolerated.

“[T]he prosecutor is not only the defendant’s adversary, but is also the ‘. . . guardian of the defendant’s constitutional rights. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sherrick (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 657, 660 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 ].) These rights include the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Exercise of these rights necessarily embraces the attorney-client privilege. (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 600 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 886 , 691 P.2d 642 ].) “[I]f an accused is to derive the full benefits of his right to counsel, he must have the assurance of confidentiality and privacy of communication with his attorney.” (Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 751 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 598 P.2d 818 ].) The intentional…

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