Certified for Partial Publication. [*]

VARTABEDIAN, Associate Justice.

Dylan T. was declared to be a dependent child of the court. At the dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered that there be no visits between Dylan and his mother, Jamie, while Jamie was incarcerated. Dylan's tender age alone, reasoned the trial court, justified the order of no visitation with the mother while she was incarcerated. In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether a finding of detriment to a minor visiting an incarcerated parent can be based on age without any further showing. We determine it cannot.

Jamie T. is the mother of Dylan T. (date of birth: Sept. 19, 1996). On September 23, 1997, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 [1] dependency petition was filed seeking to declare Dylan a dependent child of the court after Jamie was arrested and jailed for possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found true the allegations that Jamie had failed to protect Dylan because of her substance abuse (§ 300, subd. (b)) and that there was no provision for Dylan's support due to Jamie's incarceration (§ 300, subd. (g)). [2] The court ordered that visits are not permitted if Jamie is incarcerated.

A report was prepared for the dispositional hearing. The report stated that in November of 1997, Jamie was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year in jail. If approved by the probation department, Jamie could be released from jail to an in-patient residential treatment program. Regarding visitation the social service worker noted that Jamie was incarcerated at the (Kern County jail at Lerdo (the Lerdo facility) and stated, "[t]he undersigned believes that due to the minor's young age that visits while the mother is incarcerated would be detrimental to the minor." Visits were recommended after Jamie's release; the worker also recommended that family reunification services be provided to Jamie.

The dispositional hearing was held on December 15, 1997. Counsel for Jamie made the following statement at the hearing:

County counsel reiterated the conclusion of the social service worker that visits would not be in the minor's best interests due to the minor's age.

The trial court adjudged Dylan a dependent child of the court and ordered the reunification plan into effect. The court made the following order regarding visitation:

Jamie claims the trial court abused its discretion when it refused all jail visitation with her solely because of Dylan's age. Jamie argues that visits with her son were critical to the issue of reunification, it was not shown that visits with Dylan while she was incarcerated would be detrimental to him, and the trial court failed to make an informed decision on the question of visitation.

Respondent initially argues that this issue is moot because Jamie has been released from the Lerdo Facility and is in a residential treatment program; therefore she is no longer subject to the restriction that visitation shall not occur while she is incarcerated. Respondent has filed with this court an application to produce additional evidence to show that Jamie is no longer incarcerated.

The question of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis. ( In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 518 , 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 .) An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings. ( In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 .)

"The absence of visitation will not only prejudice a parent's interests at a section 366.26 hearing but may Virtually assure[] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship' between mother and child." ( In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 296, 307 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 910 .) We accept, for the sake of argument, that Jamie was released from the Lerdo Facility in February, placed in a residential treatment program, and allowed some visits with Dylan since her release. Her release does not alleviate all damage from the purported error. Jamie has been denied visitation, because of Dylan's young age, since she was incarcerated in September of 1997. Her relationship with Dylan was subject to erosion during this time. Also, although she was released to a residential in-patient program, she remains subject to incarceration. If reincarcerated, she would again suffer the consequence of no visitation. Finally, because Dylan was under the age of three when he was removed from Jamie's custody, his case is on the dependency "fast track." Recently enacted sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(2) and 366.21, subdivision (e) provide the court with the option to terminate reunification efforts after six months.

Because reunification efforts could be terminated after six months, the lack of all opportunity for visitation during a significant portion of this time is an error which could infect the outcome of subsequent proceedings. The purported error is not moot. [3]

Case law has established that in dependency proceedings, absent certain circumstances, visitation must be provided to the incarcerated parent. ( In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1010 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 .) Statutory law sets forth visitation requirements in dependency proceedings.

Section 362.1 is the general visitation statute. It provides in pertinent part:

Section 361.5 sets forth the requirements for family reunification services for the incarcerated parent. It provides in pertinent part:

In In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399 , 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 50 , reunification services were ceased and the trial court terminated Sheri's parental rights to Brittany. Sheri appealed, claiming the reunification services offered to her, as an incarcerated parent, were not appropriate or reasonable. The appellate court agreed.

The appellate court found that the most obvious problem with Sheri's service plan was the failure to provide for visitation.

Footnote 7 of the above passage states:

The trial court in In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1001 , 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 , ordered that the incarcerated father have reasonable visitation while he was incarcerated. The father appealed, claiming the trial court's order of reasonable visitation during his incarceration constituted an unlawful delegation of the power to set visitation to the department of social services. On appeal, we found the order was not an unlawful delegation of power and stated:

In In re Jonathan M. (1997) 53 Cal. App.4th 1234 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 the appellate court found that a 50-mile geographical limitation on the visitation component of the reunification plan of an incarcerated parent was arbitrary under section 361.5 and must be set aside.

What can be gleaned from these cases is that visitation between an incarcerated parent and a minor cannot be arbitrarily determined based on factors which do not show by clear and convincing evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the minor.

Although dictum in In re Jonathan M., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at page 1237 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 suggests that a specifically listed factor in section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) could stand on its own as a reason to deny visitation, the particular factor of the minor's age, without some supporting evidence demonstrating how the age of the minor resulted in detriment when visiting the incarcerated parent, cannot be utilized by itself to deny visitation. The court must consider each listed factor and any other additional factors when it determines detriment. Any one factor or combination of factors might result in a finding of detriment, but it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence how the factor or factors result in a detriment.

Throughout the Welfare and Institutions Code the Legislature repeatedly saw fit to enact statutes with various age limitations. (See, for example, § 300, subd. (e), § 317, subd. (e), § 353.1, subd. (b), § 361.2, subd. (e)(6), § 361.5, and § 366.21.) If the Legislature believed visitation with an incarcerated parent by a child of a young age would be detrimental based on age alone, it could have set forth an age restriction or at the least set forth some sort of presumption that visitation of an incarcerated parent by a child under the age of two years, as an example, is presumed to be detrimental unless shown otherwise. Its failure to set forth either indicates that there should not be a blanket restriction on visitation based solely on age. "`It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.'" ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 725 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 708 , 771 P.2d 406 .)

It must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that visitation with the incarcerated parent would be detrimental to the minor. Respondent contends the following factors and reasonable inferences to be drawn from them provide clear arid convincing evidence that the well being of Dylan would best be served by prohibiting visits between Jamie and her son while she was incarcerated.

Except for factors (i) and (ii) above, respondent does not discuss how those factors bear on the question of a finding of detriment.

Respondent argues the inferences from factors (i) and (ii) as follows:

First, none of the assertions by respondent regarding the inmate population, the health of the population, and the health hazards at the Lerdo Facility are supported by facts in the record before us. More importantly, respondent has failed to show how the Lerdo Facility differs from other jails to the extent that the statutory and case authorities mandating visitation where appropriate with an incarcerated parent should not be followed.

"Every parent and child, with few exceptions [citations] is entitled to a meaningful judicial evaluation of the ... visitation question every time an order regarding reunification services is made." ( In re Jonathan M., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238 , 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 208 .) Except for the bare allegation that Dylan would suffer detriment by visiting his incarcerated parent, there was no evidence presented below that visitation between Jamie and Dylan while Jamie was incarcerated would be detrimental to Dylan. The court's finding, without substantial evidence of detriment, was error and deprived Jamie of a meaningful evaluation of the visitation question.

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for the trial court to reconsider its orders regarding visitation while Jamie is incarcerated, consistent with the views expressed herein; in particular, the previously ordered nonvisitation during Jamie's incarceration shall not count against her in the court's evaluating reunification and making of further orders. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. [4]

ARDAIZ, P.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.

[*] Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.

[1] All future code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] The identity of Dylan's father is unknown.

[3] According to county counsel, visitation is routinely refused in Kern County dependency cases when the child is of a young age. If this is true. the issue is one of continuing public importance. ( In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 74, fn. 5 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 , 859 P.2d 1290 .)

[**] See footnote *, ante.

[4] Respondent's motion to produce additional evidence on appeal is denied.