Damian

PHELAN, Presiding Justice.

Pursuant to rule 63 of the California Rules of Court, this case was certified by the Appellate Department of the San Francisco Superior Court for our review. It presents an issue of first impression: Whether the defendant in a deficiency action brought under the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ.Code, § 2981 et seq.) (hereinafter, the Rees-Levering Act or the Act) [1] can be the "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding attorney fees pursuant to section 2983.4 [2] where, prior to trial, the plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed the underlying contract-based action without prejudice.

Because neither the Rees-Levering Act nor section 2983.4 defines the term "prevailing party," respondent L. Damian urges us to look to section 1717, subdivision (b)(2)— which provides that there is "no prevailing party for purposes of [section 1717]" where an action has been voluntarily dismissed— and, on that basis, affirm the order of the municipal court denying appellant Romana Tamondong's request for attorney fees. [3] In a supplemental letter brief, Damian further contends that our Supreme Court's recent decision in Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th…