Maughan

Maughan v. GOOGLE TECHNOLOGY, INC.

Good Law
143 Cal. App. 4th 1242·2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 1574·2006 Daily Journal DAR 13833·49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaOctober 11, 2006B183969California19,185 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Mallano, J.

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 1244 OPINION Plaintiffs Mark G. Maughan and Brown Maughan, an accounting corporation, on behalf of themselves and the putative class, appeal from the judgment in favor of defendant Google Technology, Inc. (Google). Google filed a cross-appeal from the judgment "insofar as it establishes attorneys' fees and costs." By letter, this court invited the parties to brief: (1) whether the order granting Google's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 et seq.) 1 was final although the trial court did not rule on the request in the motion for attorney fees and costs; and if so, (2) whether the appeal must be dismissed as untimely; (3) whether the order granting *Page 1245 Google's separate motion for attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute was appealable; and if so, (4) whether the cross-appeal must be dismissed as untimely. We have received their responses. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment. The challenge of Maughan and Brown Maughan to the order granting Google's…

Dissenting Opinion

Vogel, J.

I agree with the majority's conclusion that the challenge to the anti-SLAPP (anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion order is not cognizable on this appeal, but dissent from those parts of the opinion affirming the award of attorney fees and refusing to award additional fees on appeal. Because my view of the attorney fee issue is based in large part on the complexity of this case and the concomitant exposure to Google, the majority's statement of facts is insufficient to make my point — and I thus offer a bit more detail. A. Mark G. Maughan and Brown Maughan (the firm is included in my references to Maughan) filed this class action against Google Technology, Inc., seeking damages and injunctive relief for libel, products liability, and unfair business practices on the ground that a Google search for "Mark Maughan Accountancy" (or a variation on that theme) generates a list of Web sites "suggesting" he was disciplined by the California Board of Accountancy for "gross negligence" and accepting a contingent fee for the preparation of tax returns, which he says are "veritable scarlet letters in the accounting world." Maughan concedes he has been disciplined for…

Opinion

Mallano, J.

Plaintiffs Mark G. Maughan and Brown & Maughan, an accounting corporation, on behalf of themselves and the putative class, appeal from the judgment in favor of defendant Google Technology, Inc. (Google). Google filed a cross-appeal from the judgment “insofar as it establishes attorneys’ fees and costs.”

By letter, this court invited the parties to brief: (1) whether the order granting Google’s motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 et seq.) was final although the trial court did not mle on the request in the motion for attorney fees and costs; and if so, (2) whether the appeal must be dismissed as untimely; (3) whether the order granting Google’s separate motion for attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute was appealable; and if so, (4) whether the cross-appeal must be dismissed as untimely. We have received their responses.

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment. The challenge of Maughan and Brown & Maughan to the order granting Google’s anti-SLAPP motion is not cognizable on appeal from the judgment. Contrary to Google’s contention in its cross-appeal, the trial court did not abuse its…

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