Bostean

Bostean v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

Good Law
1998 Cal. App. LEXIS 329·63 Cal. App. 2d 95·63 Cal. App. 4th 95·73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523·98 Daily Journal DAR 3827
Court of Appeal of CaliforniaApril 15, 1998B109857California20,508 words

Opinion

Opinion

Plaintiff, employed by defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (District) as an environmental health technician with permanent classified status, was placed on an indefinite involuntary illness leave without pay for a seven-month period, and was reinstated on his successful appeal to District's Personnel Commission, pursuant to procedures set out in Los Angeles Unified School District Personnel Commission Rule 836B. (All further Rule references are to these rules.) By way of petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiff sought a writ of mandate directing defendant to make him whole for all lost wages and benefits lost during the time he was placed on involuntary illness leave, as well as declarations that Rule 836B was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, and that the procedures and delays employed by District deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate and entering judgment for defendants. The principal issues on appeal are whether the imposition…

Lead Opinion

Lillie, J.

Plaintiff, employed by defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (District) as an environmental health technician with permanent classified status, was placed on an indefinite involuntary illness leave without pay for a seven-month period, and was reinstated on his successful appeal to District’s Personnel Commission, pursuant to procedures set out in Los Angeles Unified School District Personnel Commission Rule 836B. (All further Rule references are to these rules.) By way of petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiff sought a writ of mandate directing defendant to make him whole for all lost wages *100 and benefits lost during the time he was placed on involuntary illness leave, as well as declarations that Rule 836B was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, and that the procedures and delays employed by District deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate and entering judgment for defendants. The principal issues on appeal are whether the imposition of an…

Concurrence in Part

Neal, J.

Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the majority’s determination to reverse. As a matter of due process of law, controlling precedent *119 required that the school district hold a hearing reasonably promptly following suspension of appellant. The seven-month delay in this case violated this requirement. Further, Education Code section 45304 explicitly forbade suspending appellant without pay for more than 30 days.

I dissent, however, from the majority’s imposition of a due process right to a presuspension hearing. This is contrary to the controlling decisions of the California Supreme Court, and contrary to sound policy.

In Civil Service Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552, 564 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 586 P.2d 162 ], the California Supreme Court determined that constitutional due process does not require a hearing prior to suspension of a government employee. Civil Service held the following sufficient for due process: “[A procedure] that will apprise the employee of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, provide for a copy of the charges including materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond either orally or in writing, to…

Sign in to read the full opinion

Create a free account to read the complete opinion text, citation history, and good-law status for this case.