Olsen

Plaintiff Margaret Olsen appeals a posttrial order reducing the amount of the jury’s verdict in this personal injury case. She argues the trial court improperly reduced the amount of the medical expenses *202 awarded by the jury. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment, and direct the court to reinstate the full amount of the jury’s verdict.

Defendant Lynn R. Reid cross-appeals, arguing the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear evidence as to the full amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses. We disagree and affirm the court’s order.

I

FACTS

In August 2003, plaintiff Margaret Olsen was injured when defendant Lynn Reid struck her from behind with a motorized wheelchair. Olsen suffered considerable injuries as a result and, in 2005, she filed a lawsuit against Reid for negligence. Reid stipulated to liability prior to trial.

Before trial, Olsen moved to admit evidence to the jury of the full amount her medical providers billed her for treatment. The court granted this motion. Reid, on the other hand, moved to admit evidence of the amount Olsen actually paid for her treatment. The motion, in its factual background, stated: “Various insurance carriers have…

I write separately to sound the bell of alarm: By virtue of the Hanif/Nishihama procedure (see Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 192 ] (Hanif) and Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ] (Nishihama)) permitting the posttrial reduction of medical expenses, the collateral source rule has been buried without the dignity of any services or parting words. Without statutory authority or the Supreme Court’s blessing, the Hanif/Nishihama line of cases divorced the collateral source rule from the complicated area of medical insurance. Absent such approval, Hanif/Nishihama simply goes too far. I therefore decline to jump on the bandwagon by endorsing this procedure.

The Collateral Source Rule

The collateral source rule has long been a part of California law. “The rule derives its earliest articulation in cases of equity and admiralty, where a wrongdoer was held to be responsible for injury irrespective of whether *205 anyone else provided protection or indemnity to the victim. ‘The respondent is not presumed to know, or bound to inquire, as to the relative equities of parties claiming the damages.…

Over six years ago, the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, in Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ] (Nishihama), analyzed the law and relied on a case decided by the Third Appellate District in 1988, Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 639-644 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 192 ] (Hanif), and held: “A plaintiff in a personal injury action is entitled to recover from the defendant tortfeasor, the reasonable value of medical services rendered to the plaintiff, including the amount paid by a collateral source, such as an insurer. As medical expenses fall into the category of economic damages, they represent actual pecuniary loss caused by the defendant’s wrong. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(1); Hanif v. Housing Authority[, supra,] 200 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 641 . . . .) ‘Thus, when the evidence shows a sum certain to have been paid or incurred for past medical care and services, whether by the plaintiff or by an independent source, that sum certain is the most the plaintiff may recover for that care despite the fact that it may have been less than the prevailing market rate.’ (Hanif v. Housing Authority,…

MOORE, Acting P. J.

Plaintiff Margaret Olsen appeals a posttrial order reducing the amount of the jury's verdict in this personal injury case. She argues the trial court improperly reduced the amount of the medical expenses awarded by the jury. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment, and direct the court to reinstate the full amount of the jury's verdict.

Defendant Lynn R. Reid cross-appeals, arguing the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear evidence as to the full amount of plaintiff's medical expenses. We disagree and affirm the court's order.

In August 2003, plaintiff Margaret Olsen was injured when defendant Lynn Reid struck her from behind with a motorized wheelchair. Olsen suffered considerable injuries as a result, and in 2005, she filed a lawsuit against Reid for negligence. Reid stipulated to liability prior to trial.

Before trial, Olsen moved to admit evidence to the jury of the full amount her medical providers billed her for treatment. The court granted this motion. Reid, on the other hand, moved to admit evidence of the amount Olsen actually paid for her treatment. The motion, in its factual background, stated: "Various insurance carriers have paid…