Saika

J(1) Arbitration has become highly favored as an economical, efficient alternative to traditional litigation in law courts. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ] [“the Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration. . . .”’]; Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 322 [197 CaLRptr. 581, 673 P.2d 251 ] [“speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [131 CaLRptr. 882, 552 P.2d 1178 ] [“common, expeditious, and judicially favored”].) And given its favored status, courts “indulge” every “intendment” to implement and give effect to arbitration proceedings. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9 ; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 189 [151 CaLRptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261 ]; Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [129 CaLRptr. 489].)

The “very essence” of arbitration is finality. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9 ; Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 402 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 151 , 696 P.2d…