Forrest

Ernestine Forrest filed suit against respondents Vin propria persona. At the time she had been designated a vexatious litigant and was subject to a prefiling order which prohibited her from filing suit without counsel or obtaining permission from the presiding judge to proceed unrepresented. Forrest later retained counsel, but the court permitted counsel to withdraw on the day the case was set for trial. When appellant failed to. retain new counsel after a number of continuances, the court dismissed the case and later denied reconsideration of the dismissal when Forrest appeared with counsel.

We hold here that the trial court has authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 1 to dismiss a lawsuit during the pendency of litigation when a vexatious litigant under a prefiling order is not represented by counsel and has not obtained permission from the presiding judge to proceed unrepresented. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the dismissal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Forrest Declared a Vexatious Litigant

In 1994, Division Five of this court declared Forrest a vexatious litigant and issued a prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision…

I respectfully dissent.

The majority has rewritten Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 1 to say what it believes the statute should say. But, “[i]n the construction of a statute . . ., [our role] is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted . . . .” (§ 1858.) Only the Legislature can rewrite a statute. All we can do is faithfully apply the rules of statutory construction.

According to those rules, “ ‘we must ascertain the intent of the drafters so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context.’ [Citation.]” (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 , 74 P.3d 166 ].) If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning governs and it is unnecessary to resort to extrinsic sources to determine the legislative intent. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 , 62…

DOI TODD, J.

Appellant Ernestine Forrest filed suit against respondents in propria persona. At the time she had been designated a vexatious litigant and was subject to a prefiling order which prohibited her from filing suit without counsel or obtaining permission from the presiding judge to proceed unrepresented. Forrest later retained counsel, but the court permitted counsel to withdraw on the day the case was set for trial. When appellant failed to retain new counsel after a number of continuances, the court dismissed the case and later denied reconsideration of the dismissal when Forrest appeared with counsel.

We hold here that the trial court has authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 [1] to dismiss a lawsuit during the pendency of litigation when a vexatious litigant under a prefiling order is not represented by counsel and has not obtained permission from the presiding judge to proceed unrepresented. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the dismissal.

In 1994, Division Five of this court declared Forrest a vexatious litigant and issued a prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision (a) that prohibited her from filing any new litigation in…