Fletcher

In this case we consider whether the procedure first described in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 (Pitchess) permits discovery of the fact that an arresting officer previously worked for another law enforcement agency. We conclude that nothing in the statutory scheme which codified the principles set forth in Pitchess precludes disclosure of the length of an officer's present employment or potentially relevant facts relating to law enforcement employment other than the officer's current job. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to vacate its prior order and to conduct further proceedings to determine whether the real party in interest has information pertaining to these officers' history of law enforcement employment that can lead to evidence potentially relevant to the petitioner's defense.

Christopher Fletcher (petitioner) is charged with unlawfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a police officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, a misdemeanor. Petitioner pled not guilty to the charge and filed a Pitchess motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 (for discovery of certain information from the…

In this case we consider whether the procedure first described in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. *389 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] (Pitchess) permits discovery of the fact that an arresting officer previously worked for another law enforcement agency. We conclude that nothing in the statutory scheme which codified the principles set forth in Pitchess precludes disclosure of the length of an officer’s present employment or potentially relevant facts relating to law enforcement employment other than the officer’s current job. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to vacate its prior order and to conduct further proceedings to determine whether the real party in interest has information pertaining to these officers’ history of law enforcement employment that can lead to evidence potentially relevant to the petitioner’s defense.

Background

Christopher Fletcher (petitioner) is charged with unlawfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a police, officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, a misdemeanor. Petitioner pled not guilty to the charge and filed a Pitchess motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 (for discovery of certain information…

I respectfully dissent. I believe the majority (1) mischaracterizes the trial court’s ruling regarding the issue of good cause and, in the process, fails to address that court’s explicit (and correct) ruling that petitioner did not show good cause for his request No. 10, (2) incorrectly posits a de novo standard of review and errs by holding, alternatively, that the court either failed to exercise or abused its discretion, (3) misapplies the admittedly applicable relevancy test, and (4) in the process effectively announces a statewide amendment to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (sections 1043 and 1045).

I will discuss these points in the order just noted.

I.

The majority’s opinion rests very substantially on the premise that the trial court in fact found “good cause” for the grant of petitioner’s “Request Number 10” (Request 10). Because I believe the record belies this, a brief summary of that record is appropriate.

First of all, it is noteworthy that counsel for the real party in interest, the Oakland Police Department (OPD), objected on “good cause” grounds to both the motion in its entirety and as to Request 10 specifically. In his reply to the OPD’s opposition,…