Scott

In 1998, defendant Harrison Scott was convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) arising out of the same facts. Both of those convictions are alleged as prior strikes in the instant case, and defendant contends one of them must be stricken.

In People v. Burgos (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1209 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 566 ] (Burgos), Division Two of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, discussed this issue. We find the holding in Burgos difficult to discern. It can reasonably be read to state that in such cases one strike must be stricken, or that the connection between the two strikes is but one factor a trial court must consider in conducting a traditional Romero analysis (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ]).

By applying the definition of a “strike” as provided by the three strikes law, and by closely hewing to People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 , 954 P.2d 557 ] (Benson), we conclude that in such cases, the trial court is not compelled to strike a strike, but must consider the closeness of the two strikes as an additional circumstance in conducting a Romero…