EGAR
EGAR v. Superior Court
Opinion
Opinion
Yegan, J.
Penal Code section 1465.8, in pertinent part, provides for the imposition of a $20 court security fee for “every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense . . . ." Emily S. and Cameron V., both minors, were declared wards of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) upon findings that they committed misdemeanors. As a term of probation and over the objection of minors’ counsel, the court ordered both to pay the $20 court security fee.
The Santa Barbara County Public Defender contests the juvenile court’s imposition of the $20 fee. The public defender meritoriously contends that juvenile court adjudications of wardships are not convictions and, consequently, Penal Code section 1465.8 is inapplicable.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when a statute’s language is plain, we are to consult the words of the statute, “giving the language its usual, ordinary meaning.” (Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751 , 16 P.3d 166 ].) Courts should not attempt to afford a statute greater breadth than that afforded by its plain language. (Collins v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1249 [ 108…