Jones

Marshall E. Jones appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his conviction of seven counts of robbery, with three findings of the use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§211, 12022.5, subd. (a) [counts 1, 3, 4]) and of evading a police officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), after he pled guilty to being an ex-felon in *1050 possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)). 1 He contends: “![.] The trial court committed reversible error by giving confusing instructions on the element of possession. II[.] The trial court denied appellant a jury trial by failing to instruct the jury on the ‘asportation’ element of robbery.”

Facts

Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 864 P.2d 103 ]), the evidence established about 5:55 a.m. on February 14, 1994, the assistant branch manager for the Contractor’s Warehouse in Carson, Jose Molina (count 1), was there, in front of the cash registers, talking with the store’s truck driver, Edwardo “Ed” Valdez (count 2). Assistant front end manager Brian Rhodes (count 3) was working cash register three. Employee Eric Tapia…

I respectfully dissent.

The evidence of truck driver Valdez’s role at the store and during the robbery was not sufficiently illuminated to show Valdez properly can be treated as having the same implied authority over the cash and store property as have store clerks and security personnel. “Robbery is an offense against the person who has either actual or constructive possession over the goods. . . .” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 26 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 909 ], citation omitted.)

The difference is explained in People v. Bekele (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ]: “ ‘A person must [be shown to] have an ownership interest in the property taken, or some representative capacity with respect to the owner of the property taken, or actual possession of the property taken, for the taking of the property to constitute robbery.’ ” (Id. at p. 1461, italics in original, quoting from State v. Latham (1983) 35 Wn.App. 862 [ 670 P.2d 689, 691 .]

The Bekele court explained a passenger in a car stolen by force from both its owner and a passenger is not a victim of robbery. The reason is that the passenger has no express or implied authority over the car, and does not…

WOODS (Fred), J.

Marshall E. Jones appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his conviction of seven counts of robbery, with three findings of the use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.5, subd. (a) [counts 1, 3, 4]) and of evading a police officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), after he pled guilty to being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)). [1] He contends: "I[.] The trial court committed reversible error by giving confusing instructions on the element of possession. II[.] The trial court denied appellant a jury trial by failing to instruct the jury on the `asportation' element of robbery."

Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal ( People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 [ 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 23 , 864 P.2d 103 ]), the evidence established about 5:55 a.m. on February 14, 1994, the assistant branch manager for the Contractor's Warehouse in Carson, Jose Molina (count 1), was there, in front of the cash registers, talking with the store's truck driver, Edwardo "Ed" Valdez (count 2). Assistant front end manager Brian Rhodes (count 3) was working cash register three. Employee…