In Re Chuong D.

I am in doubt that a week’s recess is erroneous or that the record fails to provide some good cause to support the trial court’s ruling. Thus, “I write separately to set forth my concerns and concur in the judgment—dubitante.” (City of Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 634 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 , 108 P.3d 862 ] (cone. opn. of Brown, J.).)

This case presents an unfortunate—but blessedly rare— instance in which both the court and the prosecutor erred, but defendant is entitled to no relief. We publish it because it seems to be that rare cautionary tale with different lessons for all the parties.

*1306 Chuong D. appeals from the trial court’s order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The order was based upon the determination he was culpable for three counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). Chuong argues the order must be reversed because the prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the jurisdictional hearing, and informed the court only after the hearing was underway that his key witness, the only one who could tie Chuong to the assault, was unavailable to testify for at least another week. Chuong argues that this conduct effectively denied him his right to a speedy trial. Additionally, Chuong suggests the court abused its discretion when it subsequently granted the prosecutor’s request for an eight-day recess in the hearing until the…

This case presents an unfortunate — but blessedly rare — instance in which both the court and the prosecutor erred, but defendant is entitled to no relief. We publish it because it seems to be that rare cautionary tale with different lessons for all the parties.

Chuong D. appeals from the trial court's order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The order was based upon the determination he was culpable for three counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). Chuong argues the order must be reversed because the prosecutor misrepresented his readiness for the jurisdictional hearing, and informed the court only after the hearing was underway that his key witness, the only one who could tie Chuong to the assault, was unavailable to testify for at least another week. Chuong argues that this conduct effectively denied him his right to a speedy trial. Additionally, Chuong suggests the court abused its discretion when it subsequently granted the prosecutor's request for an eight-day recess in the hearing until…